The Supreme Court of Canada refused to restore stays of proceedings for 31 people prosecuted following Quebec’s Project Nandou drug investigation, ruling on January 26, 2024, that their allegations of police misconduct required a more individualized assessment.

The unanimous result in R. v. Brunelle, 2024 SCC 3, left in place an order for new trials before a different judge, including fresh hearings on requests to stop the prosecutions or exclude evidence. It did not decide whether the accused were guilty or finally reject their abuse-of-process claims.

Justice Michelle O’Bonsawin’s reasons for six judges also corrected an important part of the Quebec Court of Appeal’s analysis: all 31 accused could bring the claims, including those whose own search or counsel rights had not been infringed. The alleged misconduct arose within the investigation targeting them and could engage their own rights under section 7 of the Charter by undermining the justice system’s integrity.

Justice Malcolm Rowe agreed with the outcome but wrote separately about the order in which courts should analyze overlapping Charter claims.

A collective challenge to police practices

Project Nandou investigated allegations of organized drug trafficking, mainly involving cannabis, beginning in 2014. More than 250 officers were expected to participate in the ensuing operation. Most of the 31 appellants were arrested early on March 31, 2016, and charged with drug-related offences; some also faced criminal-organization charges.

All acknowledged being informed of their right to counsel when arrested. Their responses differed: some wanted immediate access, others deferred the request, and others declined or had already consulted a lawyer.

Among those arrested that morning who sought immediate access, only one was permitted to contact counsel from a police vehicle. Others waited until reaching the station. The interval between arrest and an opportunity to speak to counsel ranged from 23 minutes to one hour and six minutes. Nobody was questioned during that interval.

The accused also challenged failures to give required notices after covert searches and the execution of warrants in judicial districts where they had not been endorsed under the law then applicable.

The accused were divided into four trial groups. A Superior Court judge stayed the proceedings against the first seven, finding an accumulation of Charter breaches and procedural failures amounting to abuse of process. The judge considered the counsel-access breaches the most serious.

The remaining groups and the Crown agreed to use the same evidence and arguments and to apply the first decision to their cases, without giving up appeal rights. Their proceedings were also stayed. The Court of Appeal set both decisions aside.

Standing did not establish entitlement to a stay

The Supreme Court distinguished the right to ask for a remedy from the right to receive it. An applicant seeking a remedy under section 24(1) must allege the essential elements of a violation of their own Charter rights; proving the violation belongs to the merits of the application.

Abuse of process can involve harm to trial fairness. Its separate “residual” category addresses state conduct so unfair or oppressive that it undermines the justice system’s integrity, even without impairing an individual accused’s fair trial or another specific Charter right.

That category engages section 7. An accused need not have personally experienced every alleged search or counsel violation to argue that the prosecution is tainted by a broader pattern of misconduct.

There must nevertheless be a sufficient connection to that person’s case. The impugned conduct must taint the proceedings or the investigation or police operation targeting the accused. Unrelated misconduct elsewhere is insufficient.

All 31 appellants met the threshold for bringing their claims because the alleged misconduct arose within Project Nandou. Whether it actually established abuse remained open.

Counsel-access findings needed individual analysis

The accused relied on an accumulation of alleged Charter infringements. The majority said the judge therefore had to determine whether those infringements occurred using the legal framework for each right, before assessing their combined effect under section 7. Deliberate or widespread misconduct could matter to that broader assessment.

The right to counsel requires police to inform detainees of the right, provide a reasonable opportunity to exercise it when requested, and refrain from eliciting evidence until that opportunity has been provided, subject to urgency or danger. Access must be facilitated at the first reasonably available opportunity.

The Crown bears the burden of showing why a delay was reasonable. Police cannot simply assume barriers to access. But the judgment did not impose a specific duty to lend officers’ personal phones or carry inexpensive devices for detainees.

The Supreme Court accepted the factual finding of an improper practice of postponing access until arrival at the station without considering the circumstances. It rejected the legal inference that this alone established a breach for everyone.

For three members of the first group, the duty to implement access had not been triggered at the scene: one declined an offered opportunity, while two had not requested it then. For the other four, the judge failed to assess the reasonableness of each delay. Relevant circumstances included safety, confidentiality, an ongoing search, telephone availability, proximity to the station and simultaneous arrests.

The improper practice remained relevant misconduct. But it could not automatically substitute for proof of the counsel breaches on which the judge’s cumulative analysis depended. Because those breaches were central to the stay decision, the Court required a new hearing rather than make the necessary factual findings itself. It did not need to decide the separate search-related findings.

Lesser remedies and the Crown’s appeal

A further error concerned the remedy. A judicial stay permanently ends a prosecution and is reserved for the clearest cases.

The Court reiterated three requirements: prejudice to trial fairness or the justice system’s integrity that continuing the case would manifest, perpetuate or aggravate; no alternative remedy capable of addressing it; and, if uncertainty remains, a balance between the reasons for stopping the case and society’s interest in a decision on the merits.

The judge had not considered alternatives, even though the accused expressly requested exclusion of evidence if a stay was refused. He needed to explain why a lesser remedy could not address the harm. Different effects on different accused could also require individualized remedies.

The Court separately rejected the argument that the Crown’s agreement concerning the remaining groups barred it from challenging the lack of individual analysis. Both sides had adopted a common record to avoid repetition, and everyone understood that the Crown would appeal. It had neither changed its position nor surprised or prejudiced the accused.

Rowe sought a clearer sequence

Rowe’s concurrence favoured a consistent order: address the specific rights in sections 8 to 14 first, including any justification under section 1, then consider section 7 if the specific right was not infringed or the infringement was justified.

The majority instead emphasized a context-dependent approach in which the frameworks could coexist. Rowe did not say its analysis was wrong, but worried that it could be read as blending distinct tests.

The appeal was dismissed. The fresh hearings were to determine the claims and appropriate remedies; the judgment did not establish the eventual outcome of the prosecutions.