
The Supreme Court of Canada upheld Emanuel Lozada’s and Victor Ramos’s manslaughter convictions on May 17, 2024, ruling that the jury had been properly instructed on when participants in a group assault can be held responsible for a fatal stabbing committed by someone else.
The 3–2 decision in R. v. Lozada, 2024 SCC 18, dismissed both men’s appeals. Neither had inflicted the fatal wound, and the Crown conceded there was no evidence they knew or foresaw that anyone in their group had a knife or would stab the victim.
Justice Mary Moreau, writing for Justices Andromache Karakatsanis and Sheilah Martin, held that the instructions, read as a whole, adequately explained causation. Justice Mahmud Jamal, joined by Justice Malcolm Rowe, would have ordered a new trial because the jury could have applied an insufficiently demanding foreseeability test.
Different roles in a fatal confrontation
The charges arose from two altercations involving people who had attended a downtown Toronto rave. After an initial fight, Rameez Khalid and a friend walked away. The other group followed; the Crown’s theory was that they pursued the pair to settle the score.
During the second confrontation, Ramos and others attacked Khalid, who fell and was punched and kicked. Lozada fought Khalid’s friend, knocking him down and repeatedly punching him. About 15 seconds into the confrontation, Khalid was stabbed twice, including fatally through the heart.
The jury found another participant, Joseph Triolo, responsible for the stabbing and convicted him of second-degree murder. Lozada and Ramos were convicted of manslaughter.
The Crown had advanced two routes to their liability: as co-principals whose own unlawful acts contributed to the death, or as aiders. The Supreme Court appeals concerned the causation instructions for the first route. The jury’s verdict did not disclose which route it had accepted.
What makes an assault a legal cause of death?
The governing question was whether each accused’s unlawful conduct was a “significant contributing cause” of Khalid’s death. That inquiry concerns legal responsibility, not simply which person inflicted the medically fatal injury.
An intervening act can break the connection between an accused’s conduct and the death. Courts may ask whether that act was reasonably foreseeable or an independent factor, but those are analytical aids rather than replacements for the overall causation test.
Drawing on R. v. Maybin, the Court explained that the precise subsequent attack need not have been foreseeable. The general nature of the intervening act and the accompanying risk of non-trivial harm must be objectively foreseeable. Merely foreseeing some non-trivial bodily harm, without sufficient attention to the intervening act’s nature, is not enough.
The trial judge told jurors that foreseeable continuing assaults and the resulting risk of non-trivial bodily harm “may be enough” to establish that an accused’s conduct significantly contributed to the death. He used that formulation both in the main charge and when jurors asked what would constitute a break in the chain of causation.
Lozada and Ramos argued that this permitted conviction without a proper assessment of the escalation to a stabbing. They said jurors needed to consider foreseeability of a weapon’s use or, at least, a heightened escalation of the assault.
Why the majority accepted the instructions
Moreau acknowledged that the challenged words could be ambiguous in isolation. But appeal courts ask whether jurors were properly, rather than perfectly, instructed and read the charge in its entirety.
The judge repeatedly stated the significant-contributing-cause test. He also directed jurors to consider whether the stabbing flowed naturally from each appellant’s conduct, was extraordinary or highly unusual, was directly related to that conduct, or was so overwhelming that the earlier acts became merely background.
The instructions connected those questions to the evidence. Jurors were asked whether the assaults made Khalid more vulnerable to a knife attack, prevented escape or deprived him of assistance from the friend Lozada was fighting. They were also asked to consider whether those possibilities actually existed.
In that context, the majority concluded, jurors would understand that foreseeable continuing assaults could support causation only if they accepted that the stabbing was of the same general nature or flowed reasonably from the appellants’ conduct. Evidence of a violent group beating and possible use of a glass bottle during the earlier fight supported that assessment.
The majority rejected a rigid requirement to first classify the intervening act as an “assault with a weapon.” It considered that formulation too narrow and potentially confusing. Lack of knowledge of a knife did not by itself settle legal causation.
A fellow assailant’s act can still break the chain
The Crown separately argued that an act by another member of the attacking group could never qualify as an intervening act. The Court rejected that proposition.
The argument arose naturally from the causation issue, and the appellants had opportunities to answer it in writing and orally. Referring to R. v. Strathdee, Moreau held that group-assault liability does not eliminate the possibility of a discrete intervening event. The inquiry remains specific to the facts and each accused’s contribution to the death.
The dissent agreed on that point.
Dissent found a risk of conviction on the wrong test
Jamal concluded that the repeated “may be enough” instruction allowed jurors to treat foreseeable further assaults and harm as sufficient, without properly considering whether the stabbing’s general nature was foreseeable.
Making someone more vulnerable to a stabbing did not necessarily establish that foreseeability. Nor, in his view, did repeating the overall causation test and posing other questions make the missing qualification clear. The problem was especially serious because the judge repeated the disputed instruction in direct response to the jury’s request for clarification.
The dissent also rejected the Crown’s request to preserve the convictions through the Criminal Code’s curative proviso, which can address a harmless legal error or an overwhelming case in which conviction was inevitable.
Jamal found the evidence did not conclusively resolve foreseeability of the intervening act. Properly instructed jurors might have viewed it as an unforeseeable assault with a weapon.
The Crown’s alternative argument that both men were necessarily guilty as aiders also failed for the dissent. The jury’s actual route was unknown, and it could have doubted whether non-trivial, non-transitory bodily harm was objectively foreseeable in their circumstances, given the absence of anticipated knife use and the earlier fight’s lack of significant injury.
The majority found no instructional error and dismissed both appeals. The dissent’s proposed new trial was not ordered.



