The Supreme Court of Canada upheld new murder trials for Jennifer Pan and three co-accused on April 10, 2025, ruling that their jury should have been allowed to consider whether a plan to kill Pan's father made them guilty of a lesser offence in her mother's death. Their attempted-murder convictions remained intact.

The 7–2 decision in R. v. Pan, 2025 SCC 12 rejected the Crown's attempt to restore the first-degree murder convictions. All nine judges rejected the accused persons' cross-appeals, which sought further relief over the attempted-murder verdicts, a Crown presentation sent into jury deliberations, possible juror bias and a warning about guilt by association.

Pan's own case subsequently changed. The Canadian Press reported on March 18, 2026 that she pleaded guilty to manslaughter in her mother's death, with her lawyer confirming the plea. That later development was separate from the Supreme Court's ruling, which established when an alternative route to criminal liability must be put before a jury.

A different explanation for the mother's death

Three armed intruders entered the Pan family home in November 2010. Pan's mother, Bich-Ha Pan, was killed; her father, Hann Pan, survived serious injuries. Jennifer Pan was left physically unharmed and tied up upstairs.

The Crown alleged that she arranged through Daniel Chi-Kwong Wong and Lenford Crawford to have both parents killed. David Mylvaganam was alleged to be one of the intruders. All four were convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder.

The trial judge presented two scenarios: a planned attack on both parents, or a home invasion in which the parents were shot during a robbery. The jury was not instructed on second-degree murder or manslaughter for the mother's death.

The defence alternative at issue on appeal was that the common plan targeted only the father. Under the Criminal Code's rules for participation in a common unlawful purpose, a participant could nevertheless be guilty of second-degree murder if the mother's murder was known to be a probable consequence of carrying out that plan. Manslaughter could arise if bodily harm that was neither trivial nor transitory was objectively foreseeable.

This was not a finding that the father alone had been targeted. It was a question about which verdicts the evidence could reasonably support.

An available inference cannot simply be rejected as less likely

Chief Justice Richard Wagner's majority reasons said an included offence must have an air of reality: the evidence must reasonably permit both acquittal on the principal charge and conviction on the lesser charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Merely raising doubt about first-degree murder is not enough.

For circumstantial evidence, the judge performs limited weighing to identify reasonably available inferences. That does not permit choosing the most persuasive account or deciding credibility and reliability. The majority held that appellate courts review this threshold decision for correctness, without deference.

There was evidence of an earlier, abandoned plan to kill the father, of Pan's different attitudes towards her parents, and of her comparatively better relationship with her mother. Some communications could also bear more than one interpretation. A reference to payment for “each” could concern each victim, as the Crown argued, or each killer.

Taken together, the evidence supplied a basis for the father-only theory and the resulting lesser offences. Strong evidence supporting the Crown's account did not remove a reasonably available alternative from the jury's consideration. Pan's own testimony advancing a different explanation did not prevent the jury from drawing inferences from the record as a whole.

The Crown could not save the convictions through the curative proviso, which permits an appeal court to uphold a verdict despite certain legal errors. It had to establish that there was no reasonable possibility of a different verdict without the error.

The first-degree murder verdicts did not themselves answer that question. A jury denied an available lesser verdict might convict of the principal offence because outright acquittal seems unacceptable. The majority left room for the proviso in rare cases involving omitted lesser offences, but found this was not one of them.

Why attempted murder remained unaffected

The error did not undermine the convictions for trying to kill the father. Both alternative theories concerning the mother's death still depended on participation in the plan to kill him. They therefore supplied no additional reasonable doubt about attempted murder.

The Court rejected the proposition that an otherwise sound conviction must be overturned simply because a retrial on another count might produce inconsistent factual findings. Separate trials proceed on their own evidence and arguments; one jury's factual findings do not bind another jury in that way.

The majority declined to follow its 1989 decision in Nygaard to the extent it required a new trial for a party to an offence solely because a principal offender received one. That reasoning had overlooked binding precedent. An error that actually contaminates an associated verdict can justify relief, but the prospect of inconsistency alone cannot.

Rules for presentations that accompany the jury

The cross-appeals also produced guidance on jury aids: material that organizes admitted evidence but is not itself evidence. The Crown had prepared a 231-slide presentation drawing together calls, messages and other records.

Before allowing an aid into deliberations, a judge must be satisfied it is reasonably necessary, accurate and fair. Necessity can arise where evidence is so extensive, complex or technical that jurors would struggle to use it without assistance or an unreasonable expenditure of time. Attractive packaging alone is insufficient.

Accuracy must preserve the evidence's relevant complexity. Fairness requires attention to the opportunity for another party to challenge the aid or offer a competing presentation, including practical resource imbalances. An aid may reflect a party's theory, but cannot unfairly distort the jury's task.

The Court called for disclosure as soon as reasonably possible, submissions where an aid is contested, a formal designation distinguishing it from evidence, and instructions explaining its proper use. Jurors must not treat it as proof or a shortcut around the full record.

Here, the defence received an unlocked version about two and a half months before closing arguments and could prepare competing charts. The jury received appropriate cautions. Another witness was not needed to authenticate the presentation where telecommunications witnesses had already explained the underlying records. The trial judge's decision survived review.

Juror contact and guilt by association

A juror's spouse, who attended court, sent messages about the proceedings that were shared with other jurors and later engaged in inappropriate conduct, including applauding a Crown witness. The judge held two inquiries into whether juror impartiality had been affected.

The Supreme Court upheld that response. The judge had sufficient information to assess actual bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias without obtaining the messages or questioning the spouse. Refusing to discharge the juror or declare a mistrial was not a reversible error.

Crawford separately challenged the instructions addressing evidence of another alleged participant's violent propensity. Mylvaganam had relied on that evidence to support his own defence; Crawford feared prejudice from his association with that person.

The jury was warned twice that association alone could not establish any accused person's guilt. The judge did not need to name Crawford individually. The governing requirement was a proper instruction, not a perfect one.

Two judges would have restored the murder verdicts

Justice Andromache Karakatsanis, joined by Justice Sheilah Martin, agreed that the cross-appeals should fail but dissented on the murder convictions.

They considered the father-only theory unreasonable on the whole record, including the execution-style attack on both parents, the intruders' arrival after the mother returned despite an earlier opportunity when the father was alone, and the communications surrounding the attack. The earlier plan and different parental relationships did not adequately support the proposed inference about that night's events.

The dissent also favoured deference to the trial judge's limited weighing of the evidence, while accepting correctness review of the ultimate legal question. In their view, the judge's gatekeeping role prevented an implausible compromise verdict; it did not improperly choose between competing reasonable accounts.

The majority's conclusion controlled: the new-trial orders on first-degree murder stood, while the attempted-murder convictions and the other challenged trial rulings survived.