
The Supreme Court of Canada restored Paul Sheppard’s six-year prison sentence for historical sexual offences against a child, ruling that sentencing judges must apply contemporary principles without exceeding the applicable historical statutory maximum.
In R. v. Sheppard, a unanimous nine-judge court rejected the Alberta Court of Appeal’s reasons for reducing the sentence to three years and 11 months. The Supreme Court also reaffirmed that appellate courts cannot use complaints about imperfect reasons as a way to substitute their own assessment of the evidence.
Chief Justice Richard Wagner’s written reasons were released on September 26, 2025. They explain the court’s April 23 oral judgment, which restored the sentence and ordered Sheppard to surrender to the authorities within 48 hours. The written decision did not impose a new six-year term beginning in September.
The sentencing judge’s findings were supported
A jury convicted Sheppard of sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching. A sexual-assault conviction was stayed under the rule against multiple convictions for the same criminal wrongdoing. The sentencing judge imposed concurrent six-year terms on the two remaining counts, with 11 days’ credit for seven days of pretrial custody.
She found approximately 10 instances of sexual abuse proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The child’s age, Sheppard’s abuse of trust or authority, the significant impact on the complainant, and the frequency and duration of the offending were aggravating factors.
The two Alberta appeal judges who reduced the sentence wrote separately. Their main objections concerned the explanation for the sentencing judge’s factual findings and her treatment of cases decided before the Supreme Court’s 2020 ruling in R. v. Friesen. A third judge would have upheld the original sentence.
Wagner emphasized the considerable deference owed to sentencing judges. An appellate court may intervene for an error in principle that affected the sentence, or because the sentence is demonstrably unfit. It cannot begin with its preferred sentence and search for an error to justify imposing it.
Reasons must be read functionally and in context: do they explain the result to the parties, support accountability and permit meaningful appellate review? The trial record, submissions and jury verdict all matter. A deficiency justifies intervention when it makes the sentence incomprehensible or appellate review impossible.
Under section 724 of the Criminal Code, a sentencing judge must accept facts essential to the jury’s guilty verdict and may find additional relevant facts from the trial evidence. Aggravating facts must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Crown need not present the same evidence again at a separate sentencing hearing.
Here, the evidence and submissions made the basis of the sentencing findings clear. The judge was not required to catalogue separately which facts were essential to the verdict and which she found independently. Nor could a sentence appeal indirectly reopen the credibility determinations underlying the guilty verdict.
The court also rejected reliance on discredited assumptions about complainants. Continued contact with an abuser, counselling or personal difficulties cannot themselves establish unreliability. Such stereotypes supplied no proper basis for rejecting the sentencing judge’s findings.
Modern principles do not change the statutory maximum
Friesen directed courts to recognize more fully the seriousness and harm of sexual offences against children. It explained why sentences based on outdated misconceptions had been disproportionately lenient and why departures from older precedents could be justified.
Sheppard argued that parity required historical sentencing principles to apply to historical offences. The court disagreed. Parity seeks consistency with proportionate sentences; it does not require reproducing sentences now understood to understate the gravity of an offence.
The Charter nevertheless preserves an important limit. Section 11(i) protects an offender’s entitlement to the lesser punishment where the legally prescribed punishment changed between the offence and sentencing. The later increase in the statutory maximum from 10 to 14 years could not be applied retrospectively here.
Common-law sentencing ranges and starting points are different. They are guidance, not binding statutory penalties. A judge can apply contemporary principles within the historical maximum. Sheppard’s six-year sentence remained below the applicable 10-year ceiling.
Older decisions are not automatically irrelevant. Judges may consider them where the facts are comparable and their reasoning fits contemporary principles. But judges are not required to balance modern cases against older, more lenient cases or give different periods fixed weights. Declining to rely on outdated precedents is not itself an error.
The sentencing judge had considered earlier starting points through the lens of Friesen. The appeal court was wrong to fault that approach or to scale modern starting points down simply to match the older statutory maximum.
Other objections did not justify a reduction
The court rejected the suggestion that describing the offending as “sexual violence” confused the offences or improperly aggravated the sentence. The sentencing judge had identified the offences and supporting acts clearly. Physical sexual contact between an adult and a child is inherently violent; additional physical force is not required to use that description.
The judge was also entitled to give little weight to an apparently clean record and favourable character references. A lack of prior convictions carries less mitigating force where offending is repeated over time, and public reputation may reveal little about abuse committed privately. New evidence before the Supreme Court also disclosed earlier assault convictions.
In additional guidance, the court criticized rigid sentencing categories based solely on the type of physical act. Harm cannot be ranked through a fixed hierarchy of acts. Starting points must remain flexible, and sentencing must remain individualized.
New parole evidence did not prevent reincarceration
Sheppard asked the court to admit two Parole Board decisions and argued against returning to custody. The court admitted the evidence despite the Crown’s objection. The decisions arose after sentencing, were credible and relevant, and could affect the reincarceration question.
The evidence showed both rehabilitation-related progress and concerns. Sheppard had participated in programming and complied with release conditions, but the decisions also disclosed seven earlier assault convictions and a pattern of abusing children while in a position of power. His continued denial of the offences was not itself treated by the Parole Board as aggravating.
The Supreme Court concluded that denunciation and deterrence required reincarceration given the gravity and pattern of the offending. At the time of its decision, most of the sentence remained to be served, and the Crown had not conceded that a return to custody should be avoided.
The order restored the original sentence, including the pretrial credit, and required Sheppard to serve the remaining custodial portion. It does not establish his present custody or parole status.
Source: Supreme Court of Canada, R. v. Sheppard, 2025 SCC 29.



