
The Supreme Court of Canada overturned Dustin Kinamore’s sexual assault conviction and ordered a new trial after finding that evidence about the complainant’s sexual inactivity entered the trial without the required admissibility hearing.
The unanimous June 13, 2025 decision in R. v. Kinamore, 2025 SCC 19, confirmed that sexual-history rules cover evidence of virginity and prior sexual disinterest. Chief Justice Richard Wagner also set out a structured process for prosecutors seeking to introduce sexual-history evidence, broadly aligning it with the process governing defence applications.
The ruling did not declare such evidence invariably inadmissible. It required judges to screen its proposed use, distinguishing legitimate evidence on a specific issue from assumptions that a sexually inactive complainant is less likely to consent or more likely to tell the truth.
Messages entered without a hearing
Kinamore and the complainant gave conflicting accounts of their encounter. The complainant described a sexual assault; Kinamore testified that the sexual activity he described was consensual.
The Crown introduced screenshots of earlier social media exchanges without a separate admissibility hearing, known as a voir dire. Some messages were explicitly sexual. Others referred to the complainant’s virginity or disinterest in a sexual relationship. Both sides relied on the material when questioning witnesses and making submissions.
The trial judge disbelieved Kinamore, finding that his account changed as he was confronted with inconsistent facts. Her credibility analysis relied heavily on the messages and testimony about them. The British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, concluding that the communications expressing sexual disinterest fell outside the screening rule.
At the Supreme Court, the Crown conceded that the explicitly sexual messages should have been screened. The dispute included whether messages indicating sexual disinterest required the same treatment and whether any error was harmless.
Why inactivity is part of sexual history
Section 276 of the Criminal Code regulated defence-led sexual-history evidence, while related common law rules governed evidence introduced by the Crown. Both protected trial accuracy, the accused’s fair-trial rights, and complainants’ dignity, privacy and equality.
The Court held that sexual inactivity includes not previously engaging in, or preferring not to engage in, sex generally, particular activities or sexual activity in particular circumstances. It is part of sexual history even though it concerns what someone has not done or does not want to do.
The statutory definition expressly included communications made for a sexual purpose or whose content was sexual. That language extended beyond expressions of sexual interest. The Court rejected earlier appellate decisions excluding virginity evidence and distinguished its Langan decision because the trial there predated the expanded statutory definition of sexual communications.
The familiar “twin myths” wrongly treat previous sexual activity as making a complainant more likely to consent or less credible. The Court identified the inverse error: treating sexual inactivity as evidence of a disposition not to consent or as a reason to believe the complainant.
Those assumptions remain discriminatory even when they favour the prosecution. They reinforce an “ideal victim” stereotype and risk undermining both the truth-seeking process and the accused’s right to a fair trial. Screening also protects privacy: introducing evidence of sexual preferences can invite rebuttal evidence and divert the trial into an intrusive inquiry about whether those preferences are true.
Legitimate uses remain possible
The Court distinguished prohibited inferences from potentially relevant evidence. Sexual inactivity might, for example, help resolve who caused a pregnancy and therefore whether sexual touching occurred, without implying anything about the complainant’s credibility or disposition to consent.
A statement of sexual interest or disinterest close to an alleged assault may sometimes qualify under the hearsay exception for statements of present intention and provide circumstantial evidence about consent or capacity. Its value depends partly on specificity and timing; it must never receive conclusive weight.
General claims that sexual-history evidence supplies useful context or helps assess credibility are insufficient. The party seeking admission must identify precisely the live issue and the permissible inference the evidence supports.
A structured process for Crown applications
The Court required a written Crown application detailing the evidence and its relevance, with fair notice to the accused and the court, generally at least seven days. Applications should ordinarily precede trial, though materially changed circumstances can justify an application during trial.
At the first stage, the judge checks procedural compliance and whether the proposed evidence could be admissible. An application relying on prohibited reasoning cannot proceed. At the second stage, the Crown must establish admissibility on a balance of probabilities, including relevance and the weighing of probative value against prejudicial effect, guided by the statutory factors.
One important difference remained: Crown evidence is excluded when prejudice outweighs probative value. The defence standard requires prejudice to substantially outweigh probative value, reflecting the accused’s fair-trial rights. Where both sides seek to rely on the same evidence, the defence standard applies.
Another difference concerned participation. Complainants had no automatic right to make submissions on a Crown application, but judges retained discretion to grant standing, particularly where the complainant and Crown disagreed. Where Crown and defence applications were heard together, the complainant should have standing on both. A complainant could not be compelled to testify at the second-stage hearing.
The framework excluded the public and jury from both stages and protected application material and hearing evidence from publication. Publication of decisions and reasons was separately controlled, taking account of admissibility, privacy and the interests of justice. Judges had to explain their admissibility decisions and, in jury trials, instruct jurors on permitted and prohibited uses of admitted evidence. A ruling could be revisited following a material change in circumstances.
Why the conviction could not stand
The Crown argued that the conviction could be preserved because the evidence would have been admitted and Kinamore suffered no prejudice. The Court rejected that approach: deciding after trial which evidence would have passed screening, and for what purposes, would require speculation.
To establish harmlessness in this judge-alone trial, the Crown needed to show that the unscreened evidence played no material role in the reasons for conviction. It could not do so. The trial judge’s assessment of changing testimony about photographs and the meaning of messages depended on the very evidence that had not been screened. Her credibility findings were inextricably intertwined with it.
The Court therefore quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial, without deciding Kinamore’s separate argument about the use of prior consistent statements. The ruling was not an acquittal, and no later retrial outcome is verified here.
The procedure described above is the framework articulated in the June 2025 judgment. The current federal consolidation records the repeal in 2026 of sections 278.93 to 278.95, which the judgment used as procedural models; this account does not assess the replacement legislation’s operation.
Source: R. v. Kinamore, 2025 SCC 19.



