The Supreme Court of Canada has upheld Mohamed Adam Bharwani’s first-degree murder conviction, clarifying that an accused must be able to make and communicate decisions grounded in reality to stand trial, but need not make decisions in their own best interests.

The judges agreed that Bharwani was fit to stand trial. They divided 6–3 over whether fresh evidence challenging a Crown psychiatrist’s reliability, together with another psychiatric opinion, justified reopening the case. The majority dismissed the appeal in R. v. Bharwani, 2025 SCC 26, delivered July 25, 2025. The dissent would have ordered a new trial.

The decision distinguishes fitness during court proceedings from criminal responsibility at the time of an offence. A person can be capable of participating in a trial while maintaining that a mental disorder exempted them from criminal responsibility when the act occurred.

A trial shaped by fluctuating mental health

Bharwani killed his roommate, Nyumwai Caroline Mkurazhizha, a 23-year-old international student, in 2013. He had a history of mental-health difficulties and was diagnosed with schizophrenia shortly after the killing.

His condition fluctuated during the proceedings. A jury found him unfit in May 2016, leading to a treatment order. A second jury found him fit in August 2016. He represented himself at his 2017 trial, assisted by a court-appointed amicus curiae, a lawyer who assists the court.

Bharwani advanced a defence of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, commonly called NCRMD. Two forensic psychiatrists called for the defence concluded that his condition prevented him from understanding the moral wrongfulness of his conduct. The Crown’s psychiatrist, Dr. Scott Woodside, disagreed. The jury rejected the defence and convicted Bharwani after a 10-week trial.

On appeal, Bharwani argued that the fitness standard was too narrow and that his hallucinations and delusions prevented rational defence decisions. He also sought to introduce additional psychiatric evidence. The Ontario Court of Appeal rejected those arguments and upheld the conviction.

Fitness requires meaningful participation

Justice Michelle O’Bonsawin, writing for the majority, interpreted the Criminal Code’s definition of unfitness to stand trial. The question is whether a mental disorder prevents the accused from conducting a defence or instructing counsel to do so.

The inquiry extends beyond knowing that a trial is taking place. An accused must understand the proceedings and their possible consequences, understand the available choices and their basic consequences, select among those choices, and communicate intelligibly with counsel or the court.

The required capacity relates to the actual defence. Decisions include how to plead, whether to testify, choosing counsel, calling or questioning witnesses, and making closing submissions. A self-represented accused must also understand key legal issues, including the elements of the charged offences and the nature of disclosure.

O’Bonsawin rejected a standard requiring sophisticated reasoning or choices that advance the accused’s interests. Such a standard could undermine autonomy and expose more people to the serious liberty restrictions associated with an unfitness finding. Conversely, setting the threshold too low would allow trials of people unable to participate meaningfully.

Delusions or hallucinations do not automatically establish unfitness. The accused must not be overwhelmed by those symptoms when making and communicating defence decisions. Temporary difficulties can be addressed through breaks, explanations, consultation with amicus or an opportunity to redo a submission, provided the accused returns to the required level of understanding when decisions must be made.

The same standard applies to represented and self-represented accused. Courtroom assistance can matter, but officials cannot make an unfit person fit merely by conducting the defence for them. Fair trial safeguards do not replace fitness.

Why the court upheld the fitness assessment

The appeal did not challenge the second jury’s fitness finding. It challenged Bharwani’s capacity during the subsequent trial and the failure to order another assessment or fitness hearing.

O’Bonsawin deferred to the trial judge’s assessment, emphasizing his opportunity to observe Bharwani and the support that returned him to the issues when he became distracted by delusional thinking.

After an initial opening focused on paranoid concerns, Bharwani delivered a second opening explaining his NCRMD defence. He reviewed disclosure, challenged the voluntariness of his police statement, addressed whether the killing was planned and deliberate, and called witnesses about his mental-health history.

Some tactical choices harmed his interests. That did not demonstrate that he misunderstood the reality of his trial. The majority also rejected the argument that delusional fear had prevented him from calling witnesses: the record showed discussions about procedure and publicity, followed by the calling of relevant witnesses.

Fresh opinions did not warrant reopening the verdict

Fresh evidence on appeal generally must satisfy requirements of diligence, relevance, credibility and a reasonable capacity to affect the result when considered with the existing record. The majority found no basis to disturb the Court of Appeal’s refusal to admit opinions from Dr. Derek Pallandi and Dr. Sumeeta Chatterjee.

Pallandi’s assessment conflicted with the trial record, including Bharwani’s reliance on amicus and his presentation of an NCRMD defence. Chatterjee considered Bharwani fit overall, despite fluctuations that could be corrected during proceedings.

On criminal responsibility, Chatterjee concluded that Bharwani was NCRMD at the time of the killing. The majority considered her opinion substantially repetitive of the two defence psychiatrists’ evidence. Her retention by the Crown after trial did not give it special status: experts owe an overriding duty of impartial assistance to the court.

The Court of Appeal had also questioned whether Chatterjee’s opinion reflected the correct legal test for NCRMD. The majority expressly declined to decide that additional issue because it was unnecessary to the result.

Disagreement over evidence from other cases

Bharwani also sought to introduce transcripts and judicial findings from two later cases involving Woodside, Nettleton and Minassian. These raised concerns about report preparation and note-taking.

In Nettleton, copying material from reports about other people produced serious factual errors in dangerous-offender reports. The majority distinguished that situation: Bharwani’s case involved criminal responsibility, and he accepted that the same copying problem was not alleged in his report. Using Nettleton to attack Woodside’s general reliability was too remote from the particular evidence at issue.

Minassian concerned Woodside’s practice of incorporating interview notes directly into his report without keeping separate documentation. The majority noted that the judge there did not find the practice undermined his opinion. Bharwani’s jury had already heard extensive challenges to Woodside’s methods, his account of interviews and his conclusions. It also had other evidence, including police statements and psychological opinions, against which to assess the psychiatric evidence.

The majority concluded that the new material could not reasonably have affected the result. It assumed, without deciding, that prior judicial findings were capable of admission as evidence.

Dissent saw a risk of miscarriage of justice

Justices Andromache Karakatsanis and Sheilah Martin, joined by Justice Mary Moreau, agreed on fitness but would have admitted the fresh evidence and ordered a new trial.

They considered the later transcripts relevant to Woodside’s general practices and willingness to reconsider errors, even without proof of copying in Bharwani’s report. In their view, existing cross-examination did not eliminate the possibility that new information would change jurors’ assessment of an important Crown witness. With the underlying transcripts available, the earlier judgments could help explain that information’s significance.

Chatterjee’s contrary opinion also acquired new value when considered alongside those concerns. The dissent did not treat her retention by the Crown as independently sufficient for admission; it emphasized the combined effect of the proposed evidence.

The dissent further rejected the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of moral wrongfulness. It reasoned that background knowledge that conduct is wrong does not necessarily defeat NCRMD if a mental disorder makes the person incapable of rationally applying that knowledge. This remained a stringent capacity requirement, not an exemption whenever illness makes wrongdoing seem attractive or justified. The majority left that legal disagreement unresolved.

The dissent did not definitively find Woodside unreliable in this case or conclude that no reasonable jury could convict. It found a material risk that the verdict would differ on the expanded record, amounting to a miscarriage of justice warranting a new trial rather than a substituted NCRMD verdict.

The majority’s dismissal left Bharwani’s conviction in place. No new trial or NCRMD verdict was ordered.

Source: Supreme Court of Canada’s full reasons in R. v. Bharwani.