
The Supreme Court of Canada upheld a conviction for transmitting sexually explicit material to a child in R. v. W.W., ruling that the trial judge applied the wrong legal test when treating the adult’s conduct as merely flirtatious.
In unanimous oral reasons delivered November 14, 2025, Justice Nicholas Kasirer said the Crown had to prove a purpose of facilitating a listed sexual offence. It did not have to prove that W.W. intended personally to commit that further offence.
The seven-judge court also upheld the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision to enter a conviction rather than order a new trial. The trial judge’s own factual findings established every element of the charged offence beyond a reasonable doubt.
A publication ban protects information that could identify the complainant. The accused is identified by the initials used in the court’s judgment.
Facilitating an offence is a distinct legal question
W.W. had been acquitted of transmitting sexually explicit material to a child for the purpose of facilitating sexual assault or indecent exposure, contrary to section 171.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.
The trial judge was left with a reasonable doubt about the required intention. The Court of Appeal held that he had wrongly characterized the sexualized conduct as “flirtatious” and confused the intention required for the transmission offence with an intention to commit one of the further offences listed in the provision.
The Supreme Court agreed that this was a legal error. The transmission offence is an inchoate offence: it addresses conduct directed toward facilitating another prohibited act. The relevant purpose is to make the child’s participation in that prohibited conduct easier or more probable.
Drawing on its earlier decision in Legare, the court explained that facilitation includes grooming a child by reducing inhibitions or exploiting immaturity. The requirement therefore focuses on what the transmission is intended to facilitate, rather than requiring proof of an intention to carry out the further sexual offence itself.
Why a conviction could replace the acquittal
Identifying the legal error did not end the analysis. The Supreme Court separately considered whether the appeal court was right to substitute a conviction on the existing findings.
It concluded that the Court of Appeal had shown the appropriate caution. Against the background of explicit sexual messages and material W.W. sent, together with his expressed desire to sexually assault the child, the only reasonable inference from the trial judge’s findings was an intention to groom the child.
The necessary intent was therefore established on facts already found at trial. The Supreme Court held that all elements of the transmission offence were proved beyond a reasonable doubt and declined to disturb the conviction.
The court also addressed the language used to describe the conduct. Calling the interaction “flirtatious” seriously mischaracterized sexualized conduct between this adult and a child, Kasirer said. Such language could normalize abusive and exploitative behaviour by presenting it as playful, erotic or affectionate. The court said that characterization had no place in an account of a charge involving sexual violence against children.
The appeal was dismissed. The judgment confirms the conviction; it does not impose a sentence or establish W.W.’s present custodial status.
Source: R. v. W.W., 2025 SCC 37.



