The Supreme Court of Canada restored an attempted murder conviction in R. v. B.F., ruling that the evidence did not support a theory requiring the jury to consider whether the accused had instead assisted a suicide attempt.

The December 5, 2025 decision divided the court six to three on the Crown’s appeal concerning an adult victim. All nine judges rejected B.F.’s separate appeal concerning attempted murder and aggravated assault of a child.

The majority left unresolved the broader legal boundary between attempted murder and aiding suicide. Its decision turned on the evidence needed before a trial judge must explain a proposed theory to a jury. The dissent considered that threshold met and would have upheld a new trial on the adult-victim count.

A publication ban protects the identities of the accused and victims. Identifying personal details are omitted.

The disputed route to conviction

B.F., an adult victim and a child were found unconscious after receiving insulin. All survived, but the child suffered life-altering injuries. The disputed questions included who administered the substance and whether B.F. participated in the offences if someone else did so.

The jury convicted B.F. of attempting to murder both victims and of aggravated assault of the child. It acquitted B.F. of aggravated assault of the adult. The trial judge stayed the child’s aggravated-assault proceedings as duplicative.

The Ontario Court of Appeal ordered a new trial on the adult’s attempted murder count. It found a problem in instructions allowing a conviction if B.F. supplied the insulin for the adult to self-administer, while telling jurors that willing participation by the adult did not matter.

In the appeal court’s view, independent participation in a suicide attempt could distinguish aiding suicide from attempted murder. The Crown asked the Supreme Court to restore the conviction. B.F. separately challenged the instructions on the offences against the child.

Majority found the proposed theory lacked a foundation

Justice Michelle O’Bonsawin, writing for the majority, first explained that aiding suicide was neither charged nor a lesser included offence in this case. The jury therefore did not have to decide whether B.F. was guilty of that offence. That point alone did not answer whether a suicide attempt could affect liability for attempted murder.

The majority declined to settle that abstract legal question. Even assuming the defence’s proposed distinction was correct, an instruction would be necessary only if the evidence gave the suicide-attempt theory an “air of reality.”

That test asks whether the necessary factual inferences are reasonably available on the evidence as a whole. It allows limited weighing of circumstantial evidence, but does not authorize judges to choose the most plausible inference or decide credibility. The screening step keeps unsupported theories from confusing the jury or needlessly extending instructions.

The defence relied on the absence of evidence of a struggle, evidence that B.F. could not physically overpower the adult, and testimony about shared authorship of a letter the Crown characterized as a suicide note.

For the majority, evidence that someone might have self-administered a substance did not itself establish an intention to die. The required inferences of self-administration and suicidal intent had to be available together on the same reasonable view of the record. There was no testimony suggesting the adult intended suicide, and no evidence establishing knowledge of the substance’s administration or consequences.

The letter did not supply the missing foundation. It was signed only by B.F., and both witnesses disputed its characterization as a suicide note. Inferring that it expressed the adult’s suicidal intention required a tenuous chain of assumptions. The majority found the theory speculative when the letter was considered with the rest of the evidence.

Neither side had advanced at trial the particular theory that B.F. assisted the adult’s voluntary suicide attempt. That context supported the majority’s conclusion, but counsel’s questions and arguments could not themselves supply evidence for an otherwise unsupported theory.

The jury had instead received the instructions required on the record: the Crown had to prove concrete steps beyond mere preparation and a specific intention to kill. The majority restored the adult-victim conviction.

Dissent would have required instructions on autonomous choice

Justices Andromache Karakatsanis and Mary Moreau, joined by Chief Justice Richard Wagner, considered a voluntary suicide attempt a realistic inference. They emphasized the low evidentiary threshold and the judge’s duty to explain relevant law even when neither party expressly advances a theory.

Their assessment included the absence of a struggle, the circumstances in which the adults were found, the testimony about the letter, and the lack of direct evidence of deception or coercion. They also relied on an alternative theory already left with the jury: that the adult had acted independently against the others before self-administering the substance.

The dissent acknowledged that the letter alone did not establish suicidal intent. But it considered the overall circumstantial record sufficient and criticized the majority for exceeding the judge’s limited screening role. It also read the adult-assault acquittal as indicating reasonable doubt about whether B.F. physically administered the substance, making the alternative route to attempted murder especially important.

The dissent then addressed the legal issue the majority left open. Parliament created distinct offences of culpable homicide and aiding suicide, with different levels of moral blameworthiness. In the dissent’s analysis, an independent, autonomous choice to take one’s own life could break the legal chain of causation needed for homicide or attempted murder, even where another person supplied the means.

That would not necessarily remove criminal liability for aiding suicide. Nor would it protect conduct that undermined or overpowered the person’s independent choice. The dissent located this distinction within legal causation and rejected the Crown’s suggestion of creating a new partial defence. Because the Crown did not invoke the curative proviso to preserve the verdict despite an instructional error, the dissent would have ordered a new trial on that count.

Three challenges concerning the child rejected

All judges agreed that the instructions on the child’s counts were adequate.

First, jurors were told to acquit if evidence that another person acted independently left a reasonable doubt about B.F.’s guilt. They were also properly told that another person’s physical participation would not absolve B.F. if the Crown proved intentional participation, assistance or encouragement with the required intent.

Second, the instructions connected the necessary conduct to B.F.’s state of mind. For attempted murder, the Crown had to prove a specific intention to kill when B.F. took the relevant steps, including assistance or encouragement if someone else administered the substance. The aggravated-assault instructions appropriately referred back to the explanations of the possible forms of participation.

Third, the judge did not tell jurors that B.F.’s procurement of the insulin was an established fact. He summarized the disputed evidence and defence position, leaving the factual decision to them. His later finding about procurement was a supplementary sentencing finding supported by the circumstantial evidence, not a direction controlling the jury’s earlier verdict.

The result restores the adult-victim attempted murder conviction and leaves the child-related findings undisturbed. The judgment does not establish a general rule resolving every case involving alleged assistance in a suicide attempt.

Source: R. v. B.F., 2025 SCC 41.