The Supreme Court of Canada upheld a sexual assault conviction in R. v. B.B., rejecting an appeal over whether the trial judge misunderstood evidence central to her assessment of the complainant’s credibility.

The five judges unanimously dismissed the appeal on January 22, 2026. Chief Justice Richard Wagner said the court agreed “substantially for the reasons of the majority” of the Ontario Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court did not issue a separate analysis of the disputed evidence.

The incorporated Ontario reasons explain a disagreement about how to read the trial judge’s treatment of an apparent inconsistency: the complainant had denied abuse to police, but later testified about sexual assaults whose timing was contested. The Ontario majority found no material misunderstanding. A dissenting judge believed an error about the sequence of events had shaped the conviction and required a new trial.

A publication ban protects identifying information. The appellant is identified only by initials.

Why the majority found no evidentiary error

The Ontario appeal concerned the sexual assault conviction, not two common-assault convictions. The trial judge had acquitted B.B. on other sexual-offence charges and conditionally stayed a related sexual-exploitation charge after finding him guilty of sexual assault.

B.B. argued that the complainant’s trial account placed the assaults underlying the conviction before her statements to police denying abuse. In his submission, the trial judge mistakenly treated those denials as relevant only to other allegations on which she had acquitted him. That error, he argued, allowed her to avoid confronting a significant inconsistency.

Justice Grant Huscroft, writing for the Ontario majority, applied the established, demanding test for overturning a conviction because of a misapprehension of evidence. The error must be real, material and essential to the reasoning leading to conviction. An apparent discrepancy or a peripheral mistake is insufficient.

The majority considered the trial judge’s findings in context. She had found the complainant’s account of the assaults supporting the conviction detailed, compelling and coherent. She accepted that account as credible and reliable, rejected B.B.’s denials and found they did not raise a reasonable doubt. The allegations on which she acquitted him had other evidentiary shortcomings; the earlier denials to police were not the only reason for those acquittals.

The complainant’s evidence about timing was sometimes imprecise and sometimes mistaken. The majority concluded that it was open to the trial judge to find that the assaults supporting the conviction could have begun after the police statements. She had refrained from fixing a precise starting point, and the majority found no unresolved inconsistency requiring intervention on that reading of her reasons.

The trial judge had also recognized the effect of time on memory. For the majority, her different conclusions on different charges reflected an assessment of the evidence, rather than an obvious misunderstanding essential to the conviction.

The dissent focused on the reasoning actually used

Justice Jonathan Dawe disagreed about the chronology. He read the complainant’s testimony as placing the start of the relevant assaults before the statements to police. In his view, the trial judge mistakenly believed the complainant had not alleged that those assaults were already occurring.

Dawe accepted that a judge could find the complainant mistaken about when the assaults began. His objection was that this was not the reasoning the trial judge had actually followed. A possible alternative route to conviction could not replace scrutiny of the route she used.

The difference mattered because the trial judge had treated the denials to police as contributing to reasonable doubt on other charges. In Dawe’s view, she avoided the same concern on the conviction count by wrongly concluding there was no inconsistency to resolve. He also questioned whether a later starting point could be reconciled with her acceptance of the complainant’s account of how long the assaults continued.

The Crown relied on the complainant’s uncertain recollection of timing, weaknesses specific to the other allegations, and the trial judge’s favourable credibility findings. Dawe accepted that alternative reasoning paths were available, but would not assume the judge inevitably would have made the findings those paths required. Nor could he speculate that she would have explained the earlier denials differently: she had expressly been unable to decide why they were made.

He would have set aside the sexual assault conviction, lifted the conditional stay on the related sexual-exploitation charge and ordered a new trial on both. That proposed remedy did not prevail in Ontario or at the Supreme Court.

A separate challenge to a witness assessment

The Ontario majority also rejected B.B.’s argument that the trial judge relied on facts outside the evidence when rejecting testimony from another witness who supported the defence.

The disputed testimony concerned the witness’s response to a disclosure of sexual abuse, including a proposed hospital visit. B.B. challenged assumptions about the witness’s knowledge and the reasonableness of that response. The majority relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Kruk, which recognizes that reasoning about how people generally behave can be permissible, and often necessary, when assessing testimony.

The trial judge found the witness’s account internally inconsistent and implausible. The majority held that those findings were available on the evidence and entitled to deference. It likewise declined to interfere with her concern about the witness’s detailed recollection of unremarkable events long afterward.

The Supreme Court’s dismissal leaves the sexual assault conviction standing. Its short judgment does not impose a new sentence or determine B.B.’s present custodial status. The result rests on the Ontario majority’s assessment of this record, rather than a rule that inconsistencies in a complainant’s account can always be disregarded.

Source: R. v. B.B., 2026 SCC 1.