The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the sexual-assault convictions of David Case and Celine Loyer on February 19, 2026, dismissing their appeal over the reliability of a complainant's account of an assault that came to her while she slept.

In R. v. Case, 2026 SCC 6, Chief Justice Richard Wagner delivered the unanimous seven-judge decision orally. The Court dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons of the Ontario Court of Appeal majority, rather than issuing a separate analysis of the evidence.

The dispute concerned whether the trial judge had reasonably assessed the complainant's account as a memory of an actual event. It did not produce a general ruling that every experience described as a flashback is reliable, or that expert evidence can never be useful in a memory case.

The complainant cannot be identified because of a publication ban.

Two ways a verdict can be unreasonable

Case and Loyer were convicted after a trial before a judge alone. The complainant described a period of lost memory following a drink, then a vivid experience while sleeping in which Loyer sexually assaulted her and Case encouraged it. She maintained that this was a flashback rather than a dream.

The defence challenged the reliability of that account, not the trial judge's finding that the complainant was credible. Their argument distinguished sincerely believing an account from accurately remembering an event. They sought acquittals or a new trial.

The Ontario appeal divided 2–1 in December 2024. Justice Huscroft, with Justice Wilson concurring, upheld the convictions, while Justice Dawe would have ordered a new trial.

All three appeal judges agreed that the evidence could support guilty verdicts. None accepted that the absence of expert evidence about memory made conviction legally unavailable.

Their disagreement concerned a separate form of unreasonable verdict: even when the evidence could support conviction, a judge-alone verdict may be overturned if the reasons reveal fundamental illogical or irrational reasoning. The first problem calls for acquittal; the second can require a new trial.

The majority emphasized the narrowness of that second inquiry. An appeal court must not substitute its preferred findings or search for minor imperfections. It must identify an error that goes to the heart of the reasoning.

Why the majority upheld the trial judge

The defence argued that the trial judge reasoned in a circle: because a dictionary defines a flashback as a memory, and the complainant called her experience a flashback, the judge treated it as a true memory without properly testing that proposition.

Justice Huscroft read the reasons differently. The judge had explored the distinction between a dream and a memory with counsel at length. Read in context, her references to dictionary definitions did not replace an assessment of the evidence. She accepted the complainant's explanation of what she meant by a flashback and found that she remembered some of the assault despite gaps in her recollection.

The majority stressed that the trial judge had seen the complainant testify and be cross-examined. Her credibility and reliability findings were entitled to deference.

Other evidence mattered. The account emerged shortly after the events, rather than after a long interval or through therapy. The trial judge found no suggestion from another person had prompted it, and considered the consistency of the account as details emerged.

Medical evidence recorded bruising and reported soreness consistent with the alleged assault. The trial judge rejected an alternative explanation for the bruises and found a strong correspondence between the physical evidence and the account she accepted.

Case's communications also acknowledged sexual activity while advancing an explanation the trial judge rejected. Those statements could be used against Case alone. The majority rejected the argument that the trial judge had improperly used his statements against Loyer: she had expressly recognized that evidentiary limit.

Reading the reasons as a whole, the majority found no fundamental analytical defect. The order in which the judge discussed reliability and the confirming evidence did not undermine her conclusion.

The dissent's concern about circular reasoning

Justice Dawe agreed that expert evidence was not an absolute prerequisite and that a finding of guilt was available. His concern was the path the judge actually took to reach it.

He considered the central question unresolved: was the image experienced during sleep a true memory or something the sleeping mind had constructed? Remembering that image consistently afterward, or firmly believing it was real, did not itself answer that question.

In his view, the dictionary definitions assumed the very conclusion the judge needed to establish. He also disputed the majority's interpretation of the evidence as supporting ordinary waking memory of the assault, distinct from memory of the sleeping experience.

The dissent identified several problems with the confirming evidence. First, the judge appeared to decide that the account was reliable before assessing that evidence, leaving uncertainty about whether she would otherwise have found it persuasive.

Second, the bruising did not establish that the assault happened in the specific manner described or involved both accused together. Justice Dawe considered the judge's interpretation of its shape and correspondence with the account overstated.

Third, Case's generalized acknowledgment that sexual activity occurred did not necessarily confirm the particular assault depicted in the sleeping experience. Rejecting his alternative explanation could not become positive proof that a different account was true. His statements were, in any event, inadmissible against Loyer.

For those reasons, Justice Dawe would have set aside the convictions and ordered another trial. The Supreme Court's unanimous dismissal left the majority's disposition in place.

The separate probation issue

The Ontario appeal also challenged a probation term preventing Case and Loyer from contacting each other. They sought an employment exception, rather than changes to the custodial sentence or probation generally.

The appeal court upheld the condition, finding the sentencing judge's conclusions about rehabilitation and the public interest reasonable. Justice Dawe agreed there was no error warranting interference with that condition, to the extent the sentence appeals needed to be decided despite his proposed new trial.

That was the Ontario court's sentencing ruling. The Supreme Court's brief judgment supplied no separate sentencing analysis and made no finding about either person's later custody or compliance with probation.