
The Federal Court of Appeal has upheld the tax on advantages obtained through misuse of tax-free savings accounts, rejecting arguments that it is a penalty subject to a due-diligence defence and that the minister’s power to grant relief violates the constitutional rule against taxation without representation.
In Hunt v. Canada, 2026 FCA 88, released May 7, Justice David Stratas, writing for a unanimous panel, concluded that Parliament established the tax and its rate. The minister’s authority to waive or cancel liability is constrained relief from that tax, not unrestricted authority to invent one.
A renewed challenge to the TFSA regime
Thomas Hunt had been assessed advantage tax for five taxation years. After he sought judicial review of the initial refusal to reduce his liability, the minister reconsidered and cancelled part of it. Hunt remained dissatisfied and appealed the assessment to the Tax Court.
An earlier constitutional challenge reached the appeal court in 2020 but failed because it did not challenge all the relevant provisions. Hunt then renewed the challenge to sections 207.01, 207.05 and 207.06 of the Income Tax Act. The Tax Court rejected it in 2022, leading to this appeal.
The provisions generally target benefits from transactions intended to shift income artificially into TFSAs and other registered plans to exploit their tax treatment. Section 207.05 imposes liability equal to 100 per cent of the advantage. Section 207.06 allows the minister to waive or cancel all or part of that liability where doing so is just and equitable.
A tax rather than a penalty
Hunt argued that the charge was substantively a penalty, making a due-diligence defence available. The court disagreed after examining the legislation’s text, context and purpose.
Both official-language versions expressly describe a tax. Elsewhere, the Act uses different language when imposing penalties. A 100 per cent rate is not unique to this provision, the court added: such rates also appear where Parliament grants special tax treatment or addresses avoidance and abuse.
The possibility of relief against double taxation supported that conclusion. Penalties normally operate in addition to tax, whereas this provision expressly permits relief where another tax also arises. Parliament also expressly provides a due-diligence defence in other settings, such as directors’ liability, but did not do so here.
The purpose was to remove the advantage obtained through misuse of the regime, rather than impose an additional punitive amount. The court did not hold that calling a charge a tax always settles its character. It accepted that a sufficiently coercive and disproportionate charge could be a penalty, but found this scheme did not meet that description.
In discussing interpretation, Stratas emphasized that statutory text anchors the analysis while context and purpose must still be considered. He treated the Supreme Court’s differing approach in R. v. Wilson as an outlier rather than a displacement of its broader line of interpretation cases.
Relief discretion has legal limits
Hunt’s constitutional argument focused on section 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867. He said the minister effectively selected a rate anywhere between zero and 100 per cent, taking over a taxation power belonging to elected lawmakers.
The court instead found that Parliament had established the charge, its rate and the persons liable. The relief power did not give the minister unlimited discretion. The just-and-equitable standard had to be read in light of the TFSA regime and its anti-abuse purpose.
The statute also identifies considerations for relief: whether the tax resulted from reasonable error, whether the transactions also produced another tax, and the extent of payments from the person’s registered plan. Ministerial decisions remain subject to judicial review for reasonableness, procedural fairness and adequate reasons.
Parliament could reasonably choose individualized relief rather than an elaborate set of exceptions that tax planners might navigate around, the court concluded. It dismissed Hunt’s appeal with costs, without specifying an amount. The ruling upholds the challenged statutory scheme; it does not eliminate the minister’s power to grant relief in an individual case.



