
Prince Edward Island’s Supreme Court has dismissed a medical negligence lawsuit over a colonoscopy and subsequent bowel surgery, finding that the surgeon met the standard of care despite complications that left his patient seriously injured.
In Clarey v. Gillis, 2026 PESC 15, Justice Gordon L. Campbell rejected Norman George Clarey’s claims against surgeon Alex Gillis concerning the assessment of a precancerous polyp, informed consent and the performance of a laparoscopic right hemicolectomy. The June 29 judgment also rejected the contractual claims and awarded Gillis costs on a partial-indemnity basis, leaving the amount for agreement or further submissions.
Clarey required emergency surgery four days after the May 2015 operation and suffered serious complications, including organ failure and a prolonged hospital stay. The court accepted that his loss of bowel blood supply was related to the surgery. It nevertheless found that the evidence did not establish negligent treatment or justify inferring a technical error from the outcome.
Why another colonoscopy was not required
During a March 2015 colonoscopy, Gillis and another qualified general surgeon removed a smaller polyp but could not fully remove a larger, flat lesion near the junction of the small and large bowel. Biopsies confirmed a precancerous tubular adenoma. Gillis subsequently recommended removing the affected bowel section surgically.
Clarey’s experts maintained that another colonoscopy, better preparation or referral to someone with advanced endoscopic skills could have avoided surgery. Campbell identified two problems with the factual foundation for that position.
First, although the colonoscopy report described the preparation as “poor,” the judge accepted Gillis’s evidence that the relevant area was clearly visible. Photographs and the defence experts supported that assessment. The difficulty in identifying the polyp’s boundaries arose from its relationship to the surrounding tissue, rather than an obstructed view.
Second, the plaintiff’s experts placed the polyp in their diagrams below and apart from the ileocecal valve. Campbell found that Gillis’s description and diagram better reflected its actual location, involving the valve and prominent folds. The mistaken location made the experts’ opinions about its removal unreliable. General success rates for removing other polyps did not establish that this one could safely be removed that way.
Both surgeons had independently assessed the lesion and attempted removal during the same procedure. In these circumstances, Campbell found that their contemporaneous assessments were substantially equivalent to one colonoscopy followed by another surgeon’s assessment. A repeat examination would not improve visibility or change the polyp’s location, and would introduce risks without an expected benefit.
The alternatives available in 2015
The court assessed the care reasonably expected of a prudent practitioner of similar experience and standing in the same circumstances. Campbell expressly distinguished that contextual assessment from a lower standard for smaller communities or a demand for perfect results.
Advanced endoscopic mucosal resection, which can involve lifting a lesion before removing it, was not in general or regular use in Atlantic Canada in 2015, the judge found. He preferred the evidence of practitioners familiar with the region at that time to assumptions drawn from highly specialized Calgary practices and later developments.
Campbell found no advanced endoscopist in the region accepting referrals for this type of polyp at the relevant time. He also concluded that the standard of care did not require an out-of-province referral in these circumstances, even if such a referral had been available. The ruling was tied to the treatment options and evidence from 2015, rather than prescribing what a surgeon should offer today.
For informed consent, the distinction was between an option being available and being medically reasonable or clinically indicated. The court found that another colonoscopy offered no benefit that made its additional risks reasonable here. Gillis adequately presented the appropriate choices: leaving the polyp in place, knowing it could eventually become cancerous, or having it surgically removed.
Campbell also rejected the suggestion that Clarey had not been told he could take time to decide. Advice that the polyp could “eventually” become cancerous conveyed that surgery was not immediately required. A “semi-urgent” designation on an internal hospital scheduling form was not shown to have been communicated to him before surgery.
A separate finding on informed-consent causation
The judge went further: even if additional alternatives should have been disclosed, the claim would still fail on causation.
Applying the modified objective test, Campbell considered whether a reasonable person in Clarey’s circumstances would have declined the recommended operation after receiving the additional information. For this alternative analysis, he allowed for the possibility of more skilled endoscopists elsewhere, despite his primary finding about regional referral availability.
The assessment included the precancerous lesion, the two surgeons’ unsuccessful removal attempts, the risks and benefits of the alternatives, Clarey’s previous treatment choices and his wish to remain able to work. His evidence that he would have avoided surgery was weighed against those circumstances and the risk of hindsight after a devastating outcome.
Campbell concluded that Clarey had not shown that a reasonable person in his position would have rejected the recommendation. Any assumed failure to disclose the additional options was therefore not causally connected to the claimed damages.
What the operative record established
The second major dispute concerned whether Gillis adequately checked blood supply when reconnecting the bowel during the May operation. Clarey’s experts pointed to the absence of an express statement recording that assessment and argued that the subsequent deterioration indicated a technical failure.
The judge assessed the operative report alongside the testimony of Gillis and the assisting surgeon, Patrick McCrae. He accepted their evidence that they checked the bowel’s appearance and blood supply before completing the operation.
The report’s reference to selecting a “suitable location” for reconnecting the bowel, explained in the testimony, documented that assessment. Inspection of the bowel lining and additional stitching also supported the finding that Gillis took time and care with the connection. Campbell found that the report could have been more explicit, but that no particular wording was prescribed.
There was a separate answer to the documentation argument. Even assuming an inadequate record breached the standard of care, that omission did not cause Clarey’s injuries. The report was not transcribed until the day of the emergency operation, and the absence of a more explicit notation had not affected the intervening care.
A serious complication did not establish negligence
At the emergency surgery, the bowel connection remained intact, without leakage, but a section of bowel had lost its blood supply. Campbell accepted that the supply had been marginal, or became marginal after surgery, and failed during recovery.
He rejected the argument that the timing necessarily demonstrated a surgical error. Contemporaneous records, assessed with the defence experts’ evidence, did not show the immediate consequences expected from a significant loss of blood supply during the operation. The court also declined to draw a rigid distinction between a failure on postoperative day four and one on day five.
The judge recognized that causation can be inferred without scientific proof of the precise mechanism. Here, however, evidence of proper assessment and other possible explanations, including swelling and patient-related factors, weighed against the proposed inference. The evidence established a recognized risk of failure even when the operation is properly performed.
The dismissal addressed the colonoscopy, consent and May 8 surgery. Allegations concerning postoperative care had been withdrawn, and the later emergency operation was not itself the subject of the claim.
Source: Clarey v. Gillis, 2026 PESC 15.



