
Quebec’s Superior Court has dismissed a class action seeking a 22.5 per cent tuition refund from private schools over the shift to remote education during the first wave of COVID-19. The court found that the parents had not proved the quantitative shortfall in educational services on which the authorized lawsuit depended.
In Bernard c. Collège Charles-Lemoyne de Longueuil inc., 2026 QCCS 2509, Justice Janick Perreault also rejected the proposed refund calculation and found that the evidence could not establish liability across the defendant schools and their students. The July 9 judgment dismissed the action with legal costs. The parents’ lawyers announced on August 18 that an appeal had been filed. Their notice of appeal, dated August 7, asks the Court of Appeal to set aside the dismissal and grant a tuition refund; it does not establish an appellate outcome.
The claim concerned the 2019–20 school year at private primary and secondary schools in the Montreal metropolitan area. Although physical classrooms closed in March 2020, the schools continued providing education remotely. The parents argued that losing in-person schooling, particularly its socialization component, entitled families to recover part of their annual tuition.
Consumer protection and the school contracts
The court first rejected the contention that Quebec’s Consumer Protection Act governed these educational-service contracts. It examined the schools’ educational mission, their predominantly non-profit character and the detailed statutory scheme governing private education. Charging tuition and promoting a school did not, on this record, establish the commercial character needed for the parents’ argument.
The judge also relied on the distinction the legislature had drawn between services governed by the Act respecting private education and other kinds of instruction. The private-school regime already prescribed contractual protections, including cancellation and reimbursement rules. Its provisions could not simply be replaced with incompatible consumer-contract rules.
That conclusion removed the parents’ proposed reliance on the Consumer Protection Act’s remedies and presumptions. The court nevertheless explained that even an applicable consumer remedy would require proof of a violation and a basis for quantifying the claim.
The contractual obligations also had to be read with the emergency measures governing the school year. A May 2020 decree retroactively reduced the required calendar from 180 to 110 days and changed other instructional and evaluation requirements. Those mandatory changes affected the contracts; they were not unilateral amendments imposed by the schools.
The evidence showed that the required minimum days had already been delivered before the closures, with remote education continuing afterward. The parents did not establish a failure to comply with the modified regulatory requirements.
In-person education was not a separate guaranteed result
The court rejected the alleged implicit promises to provide education exclusively in person, to supervise children so parents could work, and to deliver a separately measurable quantity of socialization.
The educational contracts did not guarantee a particular physical delivery method. Schools and teachers retained professional discretion over how to provide their programs. Childcare and other accessory services were distinct from tuition and were outside this action; the court noted that associated fees had been reimbursed.
Socialization formed part of the educational mission, but that did not establish a promise that it would occur only in a classroom or occupy a fixed percentage of the contracted services. The court treated the relevant professional obligations as obligations of means, rather than guarantees of a particular result regardless of circumstances.
That distinction did not eliminate the schools’ obligations. It meant that dissatisfaction with remote learning, without the required evidence of contractual non-performance, could not establish the claimed entitlement to a uniform refund.
The trial had to stay within the authorized claim
An independent difficulty concerned the lawsuit’s scope. The action had been authorized to address an alleged quantitative reduction in services. The judge concluded that the parents’ trial theory about deficient socialization instead challenged the quality of education and professional choices made during the emergency.
Procedural flexibility in a class action did not permit that different claim to replace the one authorized. The court also found that the evidence failed to prove a quantitative shortfall even apart from the scope problem.
The parents’ expert assigned socialization 80 per cent of schooling. The judge found no supporting methodology or source for that percentage. It did not reflect the integrated educational framework, which did not assign fixed weights to its missions.
The expert had not assessed the defendant schools’ actual measures through their affidavits, course plans and other relevant evidence. His general premise that socialization depended on traditional classroom attendance was inconsistent with evidence of online interaction and other activities. Much of the research discussed later pandemic periods and could not establish what happened at these schools during the months covered by the claim.
The defence evidence described varied adaptations by schools and teachers. The judge accepted that educational services and opportunities to socialize continued. Parents’ increased responsibilities and dissatisfaction during the pandemic did not themselves prove a compensable failure in the services owed to students.
Individual differences defeated the proposed collective finding
The court separately rejected an inference that every school had committed the same contractual fault or that every student had experienced the same loss.
Teaching methods, programs, grade levels and student circumstances differed. Some schools were the subject of little or no evidence. Proof about one child or institution could not establish liability for another without a reliable factual basis connecting them.
Nor could the class-action mechanism supply missing proof of fault, injury and causation. The court distinguished that problem from choosing between collective and individual recovery after liability has been established. Moving to individual compensation would not cure the absence of a proven common basis for the claim.
The refund formula failed independently
Even if the parents had established a cause of action, the judge said their proposed reduction would still fail for lack of proof of its value.
They started with the reduction from 180 to 110 days, equivalent to 38.89 per cent of the original calendar. Multiplying that by their expert’s 80 per cent socialization figure produced approximately 31.11 per cent. They then reduced their demand to 22.5 per cent as a concession to the schools’ social role.
The court found the calculation arbitrary. It ignored both the legally modified calendar and education actually delivered remotely. The 80 per cent premise was unsupported, and the parents did not explain how the final 22.5 per cent corresponded to the value of any missing service. A reduction of contractual obligations required evidence connecting the amount claimed to the alleged deficiency.
The judge gave a further reason concerning services received. Parents had a statutory right to cancel their contracts but continued accepting the schools’ services. On the evidence, the absence of timely opposition to the communicated delivery changes amounted to implicit ratification of those changes. The court held that families could not obtain the proposed reimbursement while disregarding the education their children had received.
The result was a dismissal of this class action on its particular contractual framework, authorized scope and evidentiary record. It was not a finding that remote and in-person schooling were identical, or that every complaint about pandemic education lacked merit.
Source: Bernard c. Collège Charles-Lemoyne de Longueuil inc., 2026 QCCS 2509.

