
The Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal upheld refusal of permission to challenge three Labour Relations Board decisions in Oleynik v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Labour Relations Board), 2026 NLCA 31, decided August 28, 2026.
The court adopted a contextual approach to leave applications under vexatious-litigant orders, extending beyond scrutiny of proposed pleadings.
Why permission was required
A March 14, 2024 order required Anton Oleynik to obtain permission before starting or continuing proceedings in the provincial Supreme Court. The order, reproduced in 2025 NLCA 22, required an affidavit explaining the proposed case and showing both that it would not abuse court process and that reasonable grounds existed.
The appeal court upheld that order in June 2025. It held that superior courts could use their inherent powers to restrict abusive litigation when necessary, even without specific provincial legislation authorizing vexatious-litigant orders.
It distinguished dismissing an abusive proceeding from restricting a litigant’s future access. The latter can affect unrelated new claims, making the permission process important even after the litigation that prompted the order has ended.
The Supreme Court of Canada refused leave to appeal on December 4, 2025. That concerned the earlier proceedings, rather than the August 2026 ruling on permission to seek judicial review.
The 2025 reasons also explain why screening is not an absolute ban: access to superior courts remains constitutionally protected. The purpose is to protect other parties from oppressive litigation and preserve limited court resources for resolving legitimate disputes.
What the court considered
Relevant factors include compliance with the order, litigation history, the claim’s merits and economics, unpaid costs, and potential serious injustice.
Oleynik wanted to challenge two union-representation decisions and a whistleblower-reprisal decision involving Memorial University.
Under section 130 of the Labour Relations Act, employees can complain to the board about arbitrary, discriminatory or bad-faith handling of grievances by their bargaining agent. The provision addresses the agent’s conduct in handling a grievance.
The board had rejected the two union complaints because it found the faculty association had handled the grievances without arbitrariness, discrimination or bad faith. It dismissed the reprisal complaint on a different ground: it concluded that the whistleblower statute did not apply to Memorial and that it lacked jurisdiction. None of those decisions determined whether the university had grounds to dismiss Oleynik.
His proposed court application devoted considerable space to the reasons he believed Memorial had fired him. It referred to five other legal proceedings. The appeal court acknowledged that a procedural fairness complaint could in principle justify review. But Oleynik did not raise the board’s procedure until the seventh page, and the shortcomings he alleged offered little support for setting its decisions aside.
The proposed reviews did not engage with the board’s substantive reasons. The court found continued abusive litigation patterns and no reversible error. Brief refusal reasons were sufficient because their basis was clear.
One proposed piece of fresh evidence concerned a special adviser hired to support the board. Oleynik argued that the adviser had helped decide his cases. The three challenged decisions all predated the hiring. Although reasons on two reconsideration applications came later, the documents failed to show that the adviser had participated in them.
The appeal and two fresh-evidence applications were dismissed. Oleynik must pay Column 3 costs to Memorial and its faculty association; none were awarded to the board.
Oleynik later sought leave to appeal the August ruling to the Supreme Court of Canada. The docket for file 42586 records the application as completed on October 27, 2026.