
The Supreme Court of Canada upheld new trials for two accused after concluding that a trial judge wrongly restricted questioning about the commercial aspects of a complainant’s previous sex work.
In R. v. A.M., 2026 SCC 33, the Court unanimously dismissed the Crown’s appeal on October 16, 2026. The decision left intact the orders setting aside A.M.’s and M.P.’s convictions for receiving a material benefit from sexual services, procuring and advertising sexual services.
Justice Mary Moreau’s reasons addressed the Criminal Code provisions applicable to the proceedings, expressly leaving aside amendments enacted through the 2026 Protecting Victims Act. Under the version considered, the sexual-history screening regime in section 276 did not automatically apply to every sexual services or human trafficking prosecution. Its application depended on the particular proceeding’s connection to an offence listed in that section.
The ruling did not authorize unrestricted questioning about complainants’ sexual histories. The Court distinguished legitimate evidence about working arrangements and power dynamics from prohibited assumptions that previous sex work makes someone less credible, more likely to engage in sex work again or less vulnerable to exploitation.
Restrictions on the defence evidence
The prosecution alleged that the accused had used their position as drug suppliers to control the complainant and maintain her involvement in the sex trade for their benefit. The accused disputed that relationship of control and sought to question her about the financial and advertising aspects of her earlier work.
The trial judge recognized that the charged sexual services and human trafficking offences were not listed in section 276. He nevertheless concluded that the regime applied because the allegations affected the consent necessary to provide sexual services and therefore engaged sexual assault, a listed offence.
That ruling permitted some questioning but excluded other proposed inquiries into previous working arrangements. The complainant’s preliminary inquiry testimony was redacted accordingly before it was introduced at trial.
The accused were convicted of the three sexual services offences. They were acquitted of the human trafficking counts because the Crown had not proved the required purpose of exploitation; the related material-benefit trafficking charge also failed.
The Ontario Court of Appeal ordered new trials on the sexual services convictions. It found that the excluded evidence could illuminate the complainant’s relationship with the accused and who posted advertisements. It also concluded that the curative proviso could not preserve the convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed that result. The earlier trafficking acquittals were not displaced.
Parliament’s choice mattered
The Crown argued that section 276 should apply categorically to sexual services and human trafficking offences because of their sexual nature, the vulnerability of complainants and the risks of discriminatory reasoning.
The Court rejected that interpretation after examining the text, legislative context and purpose. Parliament had chosen a specific list of offences rather than applying section 276 to all sexual offences. Courts could not simply add further categories to it.
The surrounding legislation reinforced that conclusion. Parliament had expressly included sexual services and trafficking offences in neighbouring regimes governing third-party records and private records, while leaving them out of section 276’s list despite repeated legislative reviews. Those regimes protected overlapping but distinct interests; their different lists were deliberate.
Section 276 addressed misleading inferences arising from the sexual nature of past activity, particularly the “twin myths” that prior sexual activity makes a complainant more likely to consent or less worthy of belief. Evidence about the commercial features of previous work could serve a different purpose when the disputed issue concerned a relationship of control or exploitation.
The Court acknowledged that credibility stereotypes remain a danger in sexual services cases. But that concern could not, by itself, justify rewriting the statutory list.
When section 276 could still apply
The Court clarified the test from its Barton decision, which allows section 276 to apply even where no listed offence is expressly charged.
The required connection exists where a listed offence is an underlying predicate offence for the charge, where it is an included offence, or where all its elements are implicated in the proceeding. The third route requires examination of the charges, the Crown’s theory, the anticipated evidence and the broader procedural record.
Merely overlapping with some elements of a listed offence is insufficient. For example, proving control, direction or influence over someone’s movements for a procuring charge is conceptually different from proving that the person did not consent to a sexual act.
A trafficking case involving allegations of sexual assault or coerced sexual activity as a means of control could engage section 276. The inquiry concerns the facts of the individual proceeding, not the label attached to the charge. Counsel should identify potential application early, and judges should resolve uncertainty after hearing submissions.
No equivalent screening regime imposed through common law
Alternatively, the Crown asked the Court to extend the common law screening framework from Seaboyer to these offences even if section 276 did not apply.
The Court declined for three reasons. First, extending screening to Crown-led evidence in cases involving listed offences, as Barton had done, was different from adding an entirely new category of prosecutions. The same justification did not automatically carry over.
Second, the proposed expansion would have substantial procedural consequences, including applications, affidavits, disclosure of parts of the defence case, complainant representation and admissibility hearings. Those consequences mattered in an already complex system facing trial-delay pressures.
Third, equivalent common law safeguards would circumvent Parliament’s deliberate distinction between the statutory regimes. This was not a legislative gap for courts to fill through policy choices. The proposed change was more than an incremental development of the common law.
Relevant context does not establish a propensity
The Court also rejected the Crown’s argument that the Court of Appeal had revived impermissible stereotypes. The proposed evidence concerned how prior working arrangements informed the complainant’s perspective on her relationship with the accused, including autonomy, decision-making and commercial circumstances.
That was different from assuming that a person who previously chose sex work would necessarily choose it again or would be less susceptible to coercion. The evidence could help test the Crown’s account of the relationship; it did not establish that the accused had acted lawfully.
Trial judges retained their duty to stop demeaning or prejudicial questioning, impose appropriate limits and give juries instructions against discriminatory reasoning. The absence of mandatory section 276 screening did not remove those protections.
The result was new trials on the three sexual services offences, not acquittals on those charges. The Supreme Court did not decide the operation of the 2026 legislative amendments, and no subsequent trial outcome is verified here.
Source: R. v. A.M., 2026 SCC 33.



