
The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the exclusion of certain Quebec casino managers from the province’s Labour Code bargaining regime, ruling that their association had not shown the exclusion violated freedom of association.
The April 19, 2024 decision in Société des casinos du Québec inc. v. Association des cadres de la Société des casinos du Québec, 2024 SCC 13 allowed appeals by the casino operator and Quebec’s attorney general. The Court set aside a Quebec Court of Appeal judgment and quashed the labour tribunal decision that had made the exclusion inoperative for the association’s certification application.
All seven judges agreed on the outcome, but divided over the constitutional framework. Justice Mahmud Jamal’s four-judge majority endorsed a single test for freedom-of-association claims, whether they seek protection against government interference or government action to make association possible. Three judges preferred a distinct framework for claims requiring positive state action.
The result did not strip managers of constitutional bargaining or strike rights. It left the statutory exclusion applicable to this association’s application while recognizing that managers could seek court remedies for unlawful interference by their employer.
Managers sought the protections of certification
The association represented certain operations supervisors employed by Société des casinos du Québec, a Loto-Québec subsidiary operating four government-run casinos. These supervisors occupied the first of five management levels, overseeing gaming operations, customer service and unionized croupiers.
Quebec’s Labour Code excludes managers, superintendents, foremen and employer representatives in dealings with employees from its definition of “employee.” The association challenged that exclusion when it sought certification to represent first-level managers in the gaming sector at Casino de Montréal.
The supervisors had already organized outside the Code. Their association and the employer negotiated a 2001 memorandum of understanding providing for consultation about working conditions. But disputes arose over its application. The association complained about unilateral changes, failures to consult and refusals to discuss some employment issues, and argued that ordinary court proceedings could not replace effective access to a specialized labour tribunal.
The Administrative Labour Tribunal found an unjustified infringement of freedom of association. The Superior Court quashed its decision, but the Court of Appeal restored it, prompting the appeals to the Supreme Court.
One test, with a required connection to government action
Jamal held that the governing test asks two questions: does the activity fall within freedom of association, and does the challenged legislation or government action substantially interfere with it in purpose or effect?
The majority traced that framework to the Court’s 2001 Dunmore decision concerning agricultural workers excluded from Ontario’s labour legislation. Later decisions recognizing collective bargaining rights had developed that approach rather than displaced it.
Dunmore’s safeguards remained relevant: a claim must concern a fundamental freedom rather than mere access to a particular statutory scheme; the interference must be substantial; and the state must be accountable for the inability to exercise the freedom. But those considerations did not create a separate test or a higher threshold for claims seeking legislative protection.
Such claims might be harder to prove because the effects of legislation must be separated from other causes, Jamal explained. The constitutional threshold nevertheless remained substantial interference. He distinguished freedom-of-expression jurisprudence, where different thresholds had developed for positive and negative claims.
The casino association passed the first stage. It sought protected activities: forming an association sufficiently independent of the employer, making collective representations and having them considered in good faith. Asking for certification did not, in the majority’s view, reduce the claim to a demand for a preferred statutory model.
The record did not establish that the exclusion caused the problem
The majority found no unconstitutional purpose behind the exclusion. Its objectives included maintaining the distinction between management and operations, avoiding conflicts between managers’ employee and employer-representative roles, and protecting the common interests of the workers they supervised.
Nor had the association established the necessary effect. The employer had voluntarily recognized its Montréal division and agreed to a framework for consultation and collaboration. The memorandum included dues collection and paid release for specified representative activities. Those arrangements showed that the members could organize and bargain collectively outside the Code.
Voluntary recognition was not itself a substantial interference. The Constitution did not require every workplace to use the same bargaining model or prevent an association from choosing a cooperative relationship with its employer.
Jamal acknowledged that the employer had sometimes failed to honour the memorandum. But as a government corporation, it had to respect the Canadian Charter, as well as Quebec’s Charter. Court remedies remained available for substantial interference with meaningful collective bargaining, including the constitutionally protected right to strike even without enabling legislation.
There was no evidence that those remedies were inadequate. There was also no demonstrated link between the legislative exclusion and the employer’s failure to respect its commitments or negotiate in good faith. Unlike the situation in Dunmore, the record did not show the exclusion encouraged or sustained a violation.
The majority expressly declined to require proof that the managers were especially vulnerable. Where a causal connection to legislation is established, additional vulnerability need not be shown.
Why the tribunal’s assessment was reviewable
The Court also clarified judicial review of constitutional questions decided by administrative tribunals. Legal conclusions and mixed findings of fact and law attracted correctness review. Determining whether established facts amounted to substantial interference involved applying a constitutional standard, rather than simply finding facts.
Courts therefore owed no deference on that constitutional assessment. They still had to defer to findings of pure fact that could be separated from it. The distinction answered the Court of Appeal’s view that the tribunal’s specialized assessment should prevail.
Separate reasons favoured a stricter route to legislative protection
Justice Suzanne Côté, joined by Chief Justice Richard Wagner, would retain a three-step Dunmore framework for claims seeking positive state action. It required a claim grounded in freedom of association itself, substantial interference, and a causal link making the state accountable as lawmaker.
For Côté, the certification application failed at the first step because it sought access to the Code’s particular regime. The tribunal could make the exclusion inoperative between the parties, but could not issue and suspend a general declaration of invalidity that would leave the legislature room to design another constitutionally adequate scheme.
She also found independent reasons to reject the claim at the remaining stages: the exclusion lacked an unconstitutional purpose or effect, alternative court remedies existed, and any alleged interference by the employer had not been linked to the legislature’s exclusion. An International Labour Organization committee’s recommendation to change the law was not binding and could not establish that constitutional responsibility.
Justice Malcolm Rowe adopted Côté’s reasons and added that positive claims require special attention to the difference between government interference and a failure to protect against others’ conduct. He emphasized that legislatures ordinarily choose how to design labour relations systems. In his view, a distinct framework preserves that responsibility while allowing courts to require protection in exceptional circumstances.
The appeals were allowed with costs. The controlling majority’s conclusion was tied to the evidence in this case: constitutional freedom of association protects meaningful collective activity, but does not guarantee inclusion in a particular labour relations regime.
Source: Supreme Court of Canada, 2024 SCC 13.



