
The Supreme Court of Canada has confirmed that Ontario public school boards must respect the Charter rights of their employees, dismissing a board’s appeal over a principal’s search of two teachers’ private workplace notes.
In York Region District School Board v. Elementary Teachers’ Federation of Ontario, 2024 SCC 22, all seven judges agreed that the Charter applies to Ontario public school boards and all their activities. The June 21, 2024 ruling left an arbitrator’s dismissal of the teachers’ privacy grievance set aside.
The judges differed on why the arbitration decision could not stand. A five-judge majority found that the arbitrator failed to apply the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Two concurring judges concluded that she recognized the relevant framework but applied it unreasonably by relying on what the search actually revealed.
The Court dismissed the board’s appeal with costs. It ordered no new arbitration because the reprimand issue was moot, and did not award the damages the union had requested.
Private notes on a school laptop
The dispute began during the 2014–15 school year. Two teachers were concerned about difficulties within their teaching team and the possible effect on their performance reviews. Following union advice, they kept a shared log through their personal Gmail accounts.
The password-protected Google document was stored in the cloud, rather than on a school board drive or laptop. Others at the school knew the teachers were keeping it. After concerns arose about the workplace environment, the board searched its own electronic storage but did not find the log.
The principal later entered one teacher’s classroom after classes to return materials. The teacher was absent and her board laptop was open. When he touched the mousepad, the log appeared on the screen. He read the visible text, scrolled through the document and photographed its contents with his cellphone. The board subsequently seized and searched both teachers’ work laptops.
The board issued written reprimands. The union grieved the discipline, alleging privacy breaches in the initial computer-system search, the principal’s examination of the log, and the later laptop searches. It sought removal of the reprimands and $15,000 in damages for each teacher.
The reprimands were removed from the teachers’ records in January 2018 under a sunset clause in the collective agreement. That removal preceded the Supreme Court ruling by more than six years.
The arbitrator dismissed the grievance in August 2018. She found a diminished reasonable expectation of privacy and balanced it against the employer’s interest in managing the workplace. A Divisional Court majority upheld her decision; the Ontario Court of Appeal overturned it.
Public boards cannot avoid the Charter when acting as employers
The board argued that it was not government for Charter purposes and that, in any event, it had been acting as an employer rather than carrying out a governmental function.
Writing for the majority, Justice Malcolm Rowe rejected that distinction. Under the Court’s framework for applying section 32 of the Charter, an entity that is itself governmental is subject to the Charter in all its activities, including activities that might be considered private if performed by a private organization.
Ontario’s Education Act establishes public school boards as an arm of government, exercising legislatively conferred powers and functions. Public education also has a distinctive constitutional character, reflected in constitutional provisions governing education and minority-language education rights.
The principal acted in his official capacity as an agent of the board. His conduct therefore attracted Charter scrutiny.
The Court confined this analysis to Ontario public school boards. It expressly left the position of public schools in other provinces and private schools for another case.
Arbitrator had to address the constitutional right
Although the union’s grievance had not alleged a Charter breach, the majority held that section 8 was a legal constraint the arbitrator had to address when deciding the privacy issue.
The arbitrator had statutory authority to decide questions of law arising under the collective agreement. Administrative tribunals with that authority, unless their constitutional jurisdiction has clearly been withdrawn, can resolve relevant constitutional questions and must act consistently with the Charter. Workers need not necessarily start a separate court proceeding to vindicate those rights.
Rowe concluded that references to Charter cases were insufficient here. The arbitrator had assessed management rights against employee privacy interests without clearly recognizing and analyzing the teachers’ constitutional right. Neither the parties’ approach nor the collective agreement could displace that obligation.
The majority reviewed the error for correctness, meaning that the court determined the legal answer rather than deferring to the arbitrator. Whether a Charter right arose, its scope and the appropriate analytical framework were constitutional questions requiring a definitive judicial answer under the Court’s administrative law framework.
That failure was fatal to the arbitration decision. The majority also identified errors concerning the treatment of the log’s contents, the scope of protected personal information and the use of the plain-view doctrine.
Concurring judges focused on what the search could reveal
Justices Andromache Karakatsanis and Sheilah Martin agreed that the Charter applies to Ontario public school boards, but would have reviewed the arbitration decision for reasonableness.
They considered the arbitrator’s reasons as a whole and concluded that she had recognized the Charter framework. The remaining question—whether these searches infringed the teachers’ privacy—depended heavily on the particular workplace, facts and legislation. In their view, that called for deference rather than correctness review.
Even on that more deferential standard, the decision failed. The arbitrator relied on the log’s actual contents to conclude that it did not reveal sufficiently personal or intimate information.
The concurring judges said privacy protection cannot depend on what a completed search happens to uncover. The relevant question was the search’s potential to reveal information about the teachers’ personal lives and interests. That approach protects privacy before an intrusion occurs, rather than judging its importance afterwards.
The error was central enough to make the entire decision unreasonable. The concurring judges did not need to decide the other alleged flaws.
Workplace context still matters
In additional guidance that was not necessary to the result, the majority explained that section 8 analysis must fit the employment setting. Criminal-investigation rules should not simply be transplanted into a school workplace.
The analysis first asks whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, then whether the search or seizure was reasonable. Workplace policies, operational realities and permitted personal use of equipment can affect the first question. Management responsibilities and collective-agreement terms can inform the second.
The ruling therefore supplements established labour-arbitration principles with constitutional protection. It does not make every workplace search unlawful or establish an automatic requirement that school administrators obtain police-style warrants.
Source: Supreme Court of Canada, 2024 SCC 22.



