
An unsuccessful attempt to seize property can restart Quebec’s 10-year deadline for enforcing a judgment, the Supreme Court of Canada has ruled, rejecting the Mohawk Council of Kanesatake’s argument that old professional-fee debts had expired.
In Mohawk Council of Kanesatake v. Sylvestre, 2025 SCC 30, the Court unanimously held that a properly filed and served notice of execution interrupted prescription even though the bailiff took no property because he considered it exempt from seizure.
Justice Nicholas Kasirer, writing for all nine judges, distinguished an unsuccessful enforcement attempt from a judicial application dismissed by a court. The Council’s appeal was dismissed with costs on October 10, 2025.
The ruling preserved the creditors’ judgment claims against the prescription argument. It did not decide whether the Council’s property was protected by the Indian Act or authorize seizure of exempt assets.
Professional fees became judgment debts
Lawyer Louis-Victor Sylvestre and other professionals provided services to the Council between 2001 and 2003 in connection with its opposition to a proposed mining project. Some of their work went unpaid. The Council described that period as one of political and social turmoil, during which it faced financial difficulties and its affairs were temporarily placed under third-party management.
In October 2004, Sylvestre obtained a default judgment for $536,771.47, while the other respondents obtained one for $162,686.78. Both amounts bore interest. Earlier enforcement attempts interrupted prescription, and the Council acknowledged the claims in 2008 in exchange for release from one seizure.
On October 24, 2016, a bailiff filed a notice seeking to seize the Council’s movable property and funds held by a financial cooperative and two taxing authorities. He served the Council on November 23, but seized nothing after concluding its property was exempt.
The bailiff later recorded that execution had been suspended. He did not prepare minutes recording an actual seizure or a formal report that no property could be seized, known as minutes nulla bona.
In 2020, the Council sought a declaration that the judgment claims were prescribed. Quebec’s Superior Court and Court of Appeal rejected that application, leading to the Supreme Court appeal.
Filing and service were meaningful enforcement steps
Article 2924 of the Civil Code of Québec generally gives a creditor 10 years to exercise a right resulting from a judgment. The passage of time can extinguish the right through extinctive prescription.
Article 2892 provides for interruption when a judicial application is filed before the period expires and served no later than 60 days after its expiry. It expressly treats seizures as judicial applications. After interruption, the same prescription period begins again.
The Council argued that the notice was insufficient: only the actual seizure of property could constitute the necessary judicial application. With nothing seized, it said, the creditors had not taken the legally required step.
Kasirer rejected that separation between notice and seizure. The Civil Code and Code of Civil Procedure must be read together as complementary codes within Quebec’s civil-law system. Article 681 of the procedural code supplies the mechanism: execution begins when a bailiff files the prescribed notice, which must then be served on the debtor.
The notice was therefore an integral part of the judicial application, rather than a legally empty preliminary document. Filing and service demonstrated that the creditors were pursuing their established rights instead of neglecting them, while informing the Council of the judgments, amounts claimed and proposed enforcement measures.
The Court also rejected an analogy to the former writ of execution. Quebec’s procedural reform replaced that more formal process with a notice intended to make enforcement simpler and less expensive. Requiring a completed seizure would disregard the role assigned to the new notice.
Both filing and service occurred within the prescription period in this case. The Court expressly left undecided which event fixes the interruption where that distinction matters.
A bailiff’s suspension was not a court’s dismissal
The Council’s alternative argument relied on article 2894, under which interruption does not occur if the judicial application is dismissed or the proceedings are discontinued or perempted. A dismissal can therefore erase an interruption retroactively.
The Council argued that an attempt to seize exempt property was a nullity and should be treated as dismissed. But no court had dismissed the proceedings concerning property in the Council’s possession. The bailiff had simply suspended an unsuccessful attempt.
Separate garnishments directed at the cooperative and taxing authorities had been annulled by a consent judgment. The lower courts treated those measures as not interrupting prescription. That judgment did not dispose of the distinct attempt to seize property held by the Council itself.
The Supreme Court left open whether a completed seizure later annulled because the property was exempt must always be treated as a dismissed application. That hypothetical question was unnecessary to resolve this appeal.
Kasirer also distinguished the existence of a debt from the assets available to satisfy it. A debtor’s present lack of seizable property does not itself extinguish the obligation; its assets may change over time.
Debtors retain ways to challenge abusive proceedings
The Council argued that accepting the notice would leave it unable to challenge the interruption. The Court answered that a clearly unfounded or frivolous notice could be attacked as an abuse of procedure. Available remedies can include dismissal and damages.
Nor did the absence of minutes invalidate this attempt. The procedural code requires minutes to record a seizure and identify property placed under judicial control. Here, no property was seized. Minutes nulla bona could have been requested, but were not mandatory. The Council had been properly informed by the notice and suffered no serious prejudice from the alleged omission.
The Court had initially requested submissions on section 89 of the Indian Act and whether the Council’s property was situated on a reserve. It ultimately declined to decide those questions without an adequate factual record or guidance from the lower courts. Its decision concerns prescription and enforcement procedure, leaving that exemption issue for another case.
Source: Supreme Court of Canada judgment.



