Prince Edward Island’s Supreme Court has upheld a will that reduced a longtime friend’s inheritance to $100,000, finding that detailed evidence of the will-maker’s instructions overcame concerns raised by her illness, the changed gifts and the circumstances of the document’s preparation.

In Re Estate of H. June Upham, 2026 PESC 2, Chief Justice Tracey L. Clements found that Royal Trust had proved both Upham’s testamentary capacity and her knowledge and approval of the will’s contents. The January 8 reasons explain an August 19, 2025 endorsement declaring the April 5, 2017 will valid.

The result did not rest simply on the document having been properly signed. Shawn Graham, the friend challenging it, had raised enough suspicious circumstances to require the executor to prove the disputed elements through evidence. The court nevertheless found that evidence persuasive.

A smaller gift and a contested final will

Upham died on April 17, 2017. Her estate exceeded $5 million. Her final will left Graham $100,000, with the residue held in trust for her son during his lifetime and ultimately directed to charities.

That differed substantially from a January 2016 will, under which Graham was to receive $800,000 and one-quarter of the residue. Graham had helped Upham for many years, and the court accepted the strength of their relationship and her appreciation for his assistance.

Graham challenged the final will on capacity, knowledge and approval, and initially undue influence. He abandoned the standalone undue-influence claim after trial. The remaining questions concerned whether Upham could make the testamentary decisions and whether the signed document actually reflected her wishes.

Suspicion required proof, not automatic rejection

The court distinguished two burdens often described imprecisely as the burden of proof. The executor propounding a will bears the legal burden of proving its validity on a balance of probabilities. Proper execution, accompanied by evidence that the will-maker read and apparently understood the document, can support a rebuttable presumption of capacity and knowledge and approval.

A challenger does not have to prove suspicious circumstances on that same balance-of-probabilities standard. Pointing to enough evidence tending to undermine capacity or knowledge and approval can remove the executor’s ability to rely on the presumption.

Graham met that threshold. His arguments included the sharp reduction in his inheritance, Upham’s deteriorating condition, the lawyers’ role in arranging the final meetings and questions about their knowledge of her medical circumstances. That required Royal Trust to establish the disputed elements affirmatively; it did not itself establish that the will was invalid.

Detailed observations outweighed a different account

The capacity inquiry asked whether Upham generally understood her property, the people who might receive it, the dispositions she was making and how those considerations related to each other.

The court placed substantial weight on lawyer Trowsdale’s and articling clerk Johnston’s evidence and detailed contemporaneous notes. They met Upham in March 2017 to discuss instructions and twice on April 5 to complete and execute the will. Their account described an engaged person who read the drafts, asked questions, considered alternatives and gave specific directions.

Graham described a much more impaired person during the period before her death. But he was not present at those three meetings. The court could not reconcile his suggestion that Upham was effectively non-communicative during them with the detailed evidence of those who attended.

The witnesses’ relative inexperience did not disqualify their observations. Both were strong witnesses, remained unshaken in cross-examination and had recorded the discussions carefully. Experience mattered as context, the court said, but the entire evidentiary record determined the result.

Medical evidence also mattered without substituting for the legal test. A treating physician described meaningful discussions and independent medical decisions, while acknowledging that medical decision-making capacity differs from testamentary capacity. The court excluded another physician’s purported observations relayed through a lawyer because that physician had not testified.

The hospital records were not uniformly evidence of confusion. The court considered references to medication-related difficulties alongside entries describing Upham as alert, oriented or responding appropriately. It declined to treat selected entries as the whole picture.

Changed priorities were not proof of incapacity

Graham argued that the lawyer had not investigated sufficiently why Upham would reduce his gift or whether her son needed the entire residue. The court rejected that criticism on the evidence.

Although Upham did not recite a precise inventory and valuation at the meetings, discussions of substantial earlier gifts, investment accounts and support expenses showed a general understanding of wealth in the millions. The law did not demand perfection.

The notes also showed her weighing gratitude to Graham against her priority of providing for her son. She understood that a larger gift to Graham meant less available for her son’s future support. That was evidence of an active and reflective choice, rather than a failure to understand the competing dispositions.

Earlier wills supplied context, but did not freeze her intentions. Some had also placed the residue in trust for her son or benefited charities substantially. The court rejected the suggestion that favouring her son and charities over a friend inherently indicated incapacity. It was not for beneficiaries or the court to decide what she should have chosen.

Knowing what the signed will would do

Knowledge and approval required a separate conclusion: Upham actually understood the operative provisions and intended the will to work that way.

The court found that repeated reading, questions, explanations and confirmed instructions established that understanding. Isolated expressions of uncertainty, reminders of earlier instructions and minor differences between the witnesses’ accounts did not overcome the full course of their conversations.

Graham also argued that concerns about him within the law firm had coloured the advice. The court found no anti-Graham agenda. The lawyer had even suggested him as a possible residual beneficiary, a suggestion Upham rejected. Offering options did not mean the lawyer made the decisions; the evidence showed Upham made the final choices.

Nor did being elderly, hospitalized and medicated automatically preclude valid instructions. The court assessed her demonstrated understanding at the relevant meetings rather than drawing that inference from her circumstances alone.

Although undue influence had been abandoned, the judge added that she saw no evidence the law firm had unduly influenced the will’s preparation or execution.

The will was upheld, but costs remained unresolved in these reasons. The court had not decided Royal Trust’s request for substantial-indemnity costs; the parties were given an opportunity to make further submissions if they could not agree. The decision does not establish that the estate has since been distributed.

Source: Re Estate of H. June Upham, 2026 PESC 2.