
The Federal Court of Appeal ordered a labour board to reconsider whether representatives of a ship-repair bargaining council counselled employees to join an illegal strike, finding that the board had focused too heavily on whether a strike actually occurred.
In Canada (Attorney General) v. Federal Government Dockyards, Trades and Labour Council, 2026 FCA 105, released May 28, the court set aside the dismissal of the employer’s complaint and returned it for reconsideration by another board member.
The judgment did not itself declare that the council had violated the legislation. Its central point was that counselling prohibited strike activity is a distinct question, and is not confined to giving employees an express direction to stop work.
Two bargaining groups at the same workplace
The dispute arose when Public Service Alliance of Canada picket lines were established at Department of National Defence ship-repair facilities in British Columbia. Ship-repair employees represented by the Federal Government Dockyards, Trades and Labour Council (Esquimalt) were not in a legal strike position. Their council had chosen arbitration to settle the collective agreement rather than retaining the strike option.
The department expected them to work and make reasonable efforts to cross the picket lines. None crossed. Before the strike, the council issued bulletins explaining its position on picket lines, and representatives made statements to employees.
The employer alleged that this conduct breached subsection 194(1) of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act, which prohibits specified counselling or procurement of illegal strike activity. The Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board dismissed the complaint in 2024. The attorney general sought judicial review.
The council defended the board’s reasons as coherent and responsive, noting that administrative reasons need not resemble court judgments. It also relied on older cases requiring a strike to have occurred and argued that management had at least tacitly accepted employees’ absence.
Why the court heard an ended dispute
The strike was over, and the judicial-review application was moot. The court nevertheless exercised its discretion to decide it.
An outstanding grievance concerned whether missed work should be treated as paid or unpaid leave. The council had sought an adjournment of that grievance on the basis that the judicial-review decision might matter. It could not then deny any possible relevance when opposing the court’s consideration of the case.
The court also identified a broader concern: labour boards sometimes decide disputes after the immediate controversy has ended because doing so serves a practical labour-relations purpose. Those decisions should not generally become immune from judicial review solely because they were already moot. The effect of the court’s decision on the separate grievance remained for the board to determine.
Counselling is broader than directing
Justice Mary J.L. Gleason, writing for a unanimous panel, found that the board had not adequately addressed the main issue or explained its departure from established case law.
The board concentrated on whether employees had acted collectively in refusing to cross the picket lines. But its own precedents established that a representative could counsel an illegal strike even if no illegal strike ultimately occurred. The older authorities relied on by the council concerned materially different statutory wording.
The court highlighted evidence from the Rocky Point location that council representatives had recommended employees not cross. The board needed to assess whether the employer had proved those recommendations were made and, if so, whether they constituted prohibited counselling.
At the other facility, the board’s analysis was confined to the representatives’ subjective intentions and whether they had directed employees not to cross. Existing authority required attention to what representatives said and did, assessed at least partly objectively. Advice, recommendations or encouragement could matter even without a direct instruction.
The reasons also discussed statements about the consequences of being regarded by other union members as a scab. The court did not decide their ultimate effect. It said the fact that the council’s constituent unions represented skilled trades elsewhere could be relevant to assessing possible incitement, although the council’s organizational structure did not exempt it from the statutory prohibition.
Reconsideration, not a final liability finding
The decision applies the requirement that administrative reasons engage with central arguments and explain departures from established internal authority. It does not require labour boards to follow their own precedents as rigidly as courts follow binding decisions.
The court also preserved the distinction between a collective solidarity refusal by employees without a right to strike and individual decisions not to cross, particularly where violence is feared. It did not announce that every refusal to cross a picket line is unlawful.
The complaint was returned to a different member because the original member no longer sat on the board. The attorney general was awarded agreed, all-inclusive costs of $3,000.



