
A proposed class action challenging who negotiates and pays buyers’ real estate commissions has survived an appeal over whether key claims should be struck before trial. The Federal Court of Appeal left claims against brokerages and real estate associations in place, while also upholding the dismissal of claims against franchisors.
In Toronto Regional Real Estate Board v. Sunderland, 2026 FCA 171, decided October 13, 2026, the court dismissed all three appeals and a cross-appeal without costs. Its ruling concerns the legal viability and adequacy of pleadings, not proof that any defendant broke competition law. It neither awards damages nor certifies the proposed class.
A seller challenges the commission arrangement
Mark Sunderland sold his midtown Toronto home in August 2020 through the Toronto Multiple Listing Service. He paid his brokerage a commission of five per cent of the sale price, half of which went to the buyer’s brokerage.
In 2021, he brought a proposed class action for sellers of residential properties listed on the Toronto MLS from March 11, 2010. He alleges that rules adopted by the Toronto Regional Real Estate Board and the Canadian Real Estate Association shield buyer-brokerage commissions from competition by putting their negotiation and payment in sellers’ hands rather than buyers’.
The challenged rules require a listing brokerage to offer the cooperating brokerage compensation above zero, disclose the offered commission, and treat an MLS listing as an offer of that compensation. Other provisions regulate when the offered commission can change.
Sunderland alleges that the arrangement removes the downward pressure normally created when customers negotiate prices for services they use. His claim also alleges that sellers feel pressure to offer a conventional commission so buyers’ agents do not steer clients elsewhere. These are allegations, not findings that steering occurred or that commissions were unlawfully inflated.
He seeks civil damages under section 36 of the Competition Act for conduct allegedly contrary to the Act’s criminal conspiracy provision, section 45. That provision prohibits certain agreements between competitors, including agreements to fix, maintain, increase or control the price of a product or service. Separate claims rely on Criminal Code provisions addressing aiding, abetting and counselling an offence.
Price control is not necessarily price fixing
The Federal Court’s 2023 ruling allowed the alleged price-control claim against the brokerage defendants, and related party-liability claims, to proceed. It struck the claims that the arrangement fixed, maintained or increased prices and dismissed the case against the franchisor defendants. Both sides appealed different parts of that outcome.
On a motion to strike, courts generally assume pleaded facts are true and ask whether a claim has a reasonable prospect of success. Novel but arguable claims can proceed, but plaintiffs must still plead enough material facts to identify the case defendants must answer.
The appeal court rejected the argument that the pleaded arrangement was merely parallel conduct by independent competitors. The claim described written membership agreements, shared rules governing brokerages’ dealings with each other, and bilateral commission offers and acceptances. That was enough to plead an agreement rather than only similar conduct.
The judges also refused to confine price control to arrangements that dictate the amount of a price or a price change. Control must potentially mean something distinct from fixing a price. A rule that removes the service user from negotiating the price, or requires compensation above zero, can arguably fall within the provision even if it does not comprehensively determine the commission.
The distinction between how an arrangement operates and its economic consequences was important. Examining the rules’ payment and negotiation mechanics was not the same as requiring proof of anti-competitive market effects. The court left the ultimate boundary between criminal conspiracy liability and the Act’s separate civil review provisions for another day.
But Sunderland did not succeed in reviving the price-fixing, maintenance or increase claims. The alleged agreement was written down, and its terms allowed commission changes rather than setting a particular price. In these circumstances, the motion judge could focus on those terms instead of inferring an unlawful price-setting purpose from alleged market effects. Shifting payment from buyer to seller also did not, by itself, establish an increase in the price of the service.
Knowledge, intention and the role of associations
The court rejected an attempt to defeat the surviving claim by insisting that the 2010 changes to section 45 necessarily required subjective intention both to enter the agreement and to achieve its prohibited purpose. Sunderland’s alternative reading, combining subjective intention to agree and knowledge of the terms with an objective assessment of the prohibited objective, was not doomed to fail. The ruling does not finally resolve every aspect of that disputed test.
Material facts about knowledge and intention still had to be pleaded. However, courts can draw common-sense inferences from the facts alleged and consider what information is reasonably available before discovery. Allegations that brokerages expressly agreed to the rules, and that the associations developed and required adherence to them, supported the motion judge’s conclusions.
The associations could not obtain dismissal simply because they were not competitors supplying buyer-brokerage services. The court found a credible argument that a non-competitor may incur responsibility for aiding, abetting or counselling the relevant offence. It was also arguable that section 36 permits civil recovery against such a party, rather than only against the principal offender. The court emphasized that aiding, abetting and counselling have their own conduct and mental-fault requirements; their mental-fault test is subjective even where the underlying offence uses an objective element.
Why the franchisors remain outside the action
The result differed for franchisors. The pleaded conduct centred on franchise agreements requiring franchisees to maintain association membership and comply with the rules. The court upheld the finding that insufficient material facts supported the necessary knowledge and intention. Unlike the associations and brokerages, franchisors were not alleged to have created or joined the challenged arrangement themselves.
The appeal court did identify errors in the lower court’s treatment of the franchisors’ alleged conduct. Requiring adherence through franchise agreements could adequately plead encouragement for a counselling claim. But an aiding or abetting claim also required material facts supporting a completed underlying offence by the franchisee brokerages or salespersons, and those facts were missing.
The dismissal was upheld without prejudice to Sunderland seeking to amend his pleadings with the necessary material facts. RE/MAX had separately reached a settlement approved on October 8, 2025; the appeal reasons note that the approval order kept the action dismissed against it even if claims against other franchisors were restored.
No final ruling on damages or limitation defences
The Act sets a two-year limitation period, subject to discoverability. The defendants also failed to have older claims struck as time-barred. Sunderland sued less than a year after selling his home. For other proposed class members, when they discovered or should have discovered the material facts required a factual inquiry. Knowing a buyer’s brokerage would receive part of the commission did not necessarily mean knowing about the alleged arrangement behind the rules.
No costs were awarded because the certification motion had triggered the class-proceeding no-costs rule, and no exceptional circumstances justified departing from it. The decision preserves a route for testing the surviving allegations; it does not establish that real estate commissions must fall, that sellers are entitled to refunds, or that liability has been proven.



