The British Columbia Court of Appeal has refused to reopen a decision denying former tenants permission to appeal the rejection of an asset-freezing injunction against their landlord. The court found no basis to interfere with the refusal to tie up her property, or its sale proceeds, while their damages lawsuit continued.

In Solgi v Gao, 2026 BCCA 458, a three-judge panel dismissed Ali Solgi and Shiva Beiki’s application to vary a chambers judge’s refusal of leave to appeal. Justice Griffin, writing for the unanimous panel on November 12, found no legal error, error of principle or misconception of the facts. The respondents received costs under the usual rule.

A damages claim did not secure the property

The former tenants sued Dongmei Gao, her property management company and others over their eviction and the treatment of the rental property. They alleged lost income, mental suffering, damage to belongings and moving expenses, and sought repayment of rent dating back to July 2019. Their claimed damages exceeded $6 million.

Their lawsuit asserted no interest in the property itself. After Gao announced plans to sell, Solgi sought a Mareva injunction preventing the sale or, alternatively, requiring all proceeds to be held in the conveyancing solicitor’s trust account.

The May 2026 injunction application was the first step taken to advance the lawsuit since it began in July 2024. Justice Morishita dismissed it, finding no strong preliminary case for the damages claimed and, independently, that the balance of convenience did not favour freezing the asset.

Justice Winteringham then refused leave to appeal. She found no point of importance to the practice or the action and very little apparent merit. Although an appeal would not unduly delay the already slow proceeding, the factors collectively did not justify granting leave.

Review was not a second hearing of the same arguments

The panel emphasized that an application to vary a single appeal judge’s order was not a rehearing. Solgi and Beiki had to identify an error warranting intervention.

They argued that Morishita had wrongly required proof of their lawsuit’s ultimate merits and had accepted uncorroborated evidence from Gao. Griffin rejected both positions.

An asset-freezing injunction is an exceptional departure from the usual rule that a plaintiff cannot secure a defendant’s property before obtaining judgment. A judge must assess whether the claim has enough apparent merit to justify that interference. The applicants need more than a case that is merely not bound to fail, but need not prove that they will ultimately win.

The panel found that the former tenants had not supplied the evidence or legal authority needed to meet that threshold. Claims about past rent and repairs were very likely subject to statutory and limitation defences under the residential tenancy framework. The much larger claim for lost income, based on alleged harm during the eviction, lacked supporting precedent and appeared unrealistic.

Those were preliminary assessments in an injunction dispute, not a final dismissal of the damages action. Together with the plaintiffs’ delay, they supported refusing to freeze a major asset indefinitely.

No demonstrated risk that assets would disappear

The panel also upheld the treatment of the risk to any eventual recovery. Gao had Canadian ties and assets, and there was no evidence raising a concern that assets would leave the jurisdiction. Worry about collecting a future judgment did not itself justify the extraordinary remedy.

Given the weaknesses in the applicants’ case and the absence of a demonstrated real risk of dissipation, the court found no reason to require documentary corroboration of Gao’s evidence. The authority relied on by the former tenants concerned a different, post-judgment setting.

The panel rejected their complaint about costs being awarded on the leave application without submissions: costs ordinarily follow a refusal of leave, and nothing justified departing from that approach here.

Finally, Griffin observed that an undertaking to compensate the defendant if an injunction later proved unjustified would normally be required. She expressly treated its absence as unnecessary to the result in this case. The application to vary was dismissed with costs, leaving the refusal of leave in place.

Source: Solgi v Gao, 2026 BCCA 458.