A Canadian Armed Forces captain’s bid to force a decision on public funding for legal representation has been struck out because National Defence had already answered his request. The Federal Court found that a later letter repeated the same request rather than creating an unanswered matter requiring a fresh decision.

In Morris v. Canada (Attorney General), 2026 FC 1386, Justice Cecily Strickland struck Captain Trevor Morris’s application without leave to amend and ordered him to pay $500 in costs. The November 12 ruling concerned whether his request for a decision remained live. It did not determine whether the funding refusal was reasonable or procedurally fair, and it expressly preserved other relief that might be available.

A refusal followed by another request

Morris sought legal assistance and indemnification in connection with a dispute involving another Armed Forces member. His November 2025 request covered legal work responding to a cease-and-desist letter and assistance with current or future legal proceedings brought against him.

A March 19, 2026 authorization document refused retroactive and ongoing assistance relating to the letter and a Small Claims Court action against Morris. An April 7 letter communicated that refusal, explaining that the requests did not meet specified requirements of the Treasury Board Policy on Legal Assistance and Indemnification.

Morris wrote again on April 15. He asked that the matter reach the deputy minister through his military chain of command while bypassing Justice Department officials, whose conduct and advice he criticized. The letter sought reconsideration and a favourable funding decision.

Morris later applied for mandamus, an order compelling a public official to perform a duty. He maintained that his April request remained unanswered and had been accepted as a valid process through his chain of command. The Attorney General moved to strike, arguing that the decision already made rendered the application moot.

What the application actually sought

Striking a judicial review application requires an obvious, fatal flaw leaving it no possibility of success. The court emphasized the narrow relief in Morris’s notice: an order requiring the deputy minister to make a decision on indemnification. Although Morris’s affidavit and submissions challenged the refusal’s reasons, fairness and alleged conflicts of interest, those issues were outside this application.

That distinction also limited the evidence. Affidavits generally are not admitted on a motion to strike a judicial review application, but evidence addressing mootness and documents incorporated into the notice can be considered. Strickland admitted the government’s evidence primarily on that basis and considered Morris’s affidavit only to the extent it addressed mootness, disregarding his broader merits arguments.

The judge likewise rejected the Attorney General’s attempt to argue the merits of the mandamus request as a route to declaring it moot. The question was whether the requested decision had already been made, not a pre-emptive determination of the entire mandamus test.

Why the later letter did not keep the case alive

Strickland compared the scope of Morris’s requests with the decision. The authorization had expressly refused both past and ongoing assistance for the litigation identified again in his April letter. References to additional third parties and potential counterclaims concerned that same action.

The later letter also acknowledged the earlier refusal. In the judge’s view, it expressed disagreement and repackaged requests that had already been answered. Morris identified no policy provision or other authority requiring another response in these circumstances. Nor did he provide evidence supporting his assertion that a distinct, valid process had been formally accepted at two levels.

The relief sought—a decision—had therefore already been provided. The application no longer presented a live issue, and the deputy minister’s duty to decide had been fulfilled.

Strickland noted that a response explaining why the subsequent request would not be considered might have been prudent. Its absence nevertheless did not defeat the Attorney General’s mootness argument.

Why the court declined to hear a moot application

A finding of mootness did not end the analysis. Strickland separately considered whether to exercise discretion to hear the matter anyway, addressing the continuing dispute between the parties, the use of judicial resources and the court’s proper role.

Morris’s continuing objections to the refusal did not supply a legally relevant dispute for this particular application. They concerned the reasonableness and fairness of a decision, whereas the notice sought only to compel one. Any order the court could make on that request would have no practical effect on his rights.

The court also found no special reason to spend judicial resources deciding the matter. It involved the policy’s application to Morris’s circumstances, not an important issue likely to escape review or a significant constitutional question. The policy provided for reconsideration after related litigation concluded, and the Attorney General pointed to a grievance route under the National Defence Act.

Strickland refused Morris’s request for an oral hearing as well. The broader background did not alter the limited mootness issue, and she found the motion could fairly be decided in writing without extra cost and delay. She rejected the suggestion that this case determined the rights and benefits of Armed Forces members generally.

The notice was struck in its entirety without permission to amend. The court awarded the Attorney General an all-inclusive $500 in costs, but said the outcome did not prevent Morris from seeking other available relief, including a grievance or judicial review challenging the refusal’s reasonableness or fairness.

Read the Federal Court’s reasons on CanLII.