
Sea Tow Services International has lost four appeals in its Canadian trademark dispute with C-Tow Marine Assistance, leaving two SEA TOW registrations struck from the register and substantial costs awards intact.
In Sea Tow Services International, Inc. v. C-Tow Marine Assistance Ltd., 2026 FCA 177, released October 23, 2026, the Federal Court of Appeal upheld findings that Sea Tow was not entitled to the registrations and that its marks lacked distinctiveness. It also confirmed that the legal test for distinctiveness is the same in trademark opposition and expungement proceedings, although the burden of proof differs.
Justice Elizabeth Walker wrote for a unanimous panel. The court upheld Federal Court costs of $85,000 for the summary-judgment motion and $327,000 for the expungement application, and awarded C-Tow another $20,500 plus applicable taxes for the appeals.
Competing names for on-water assistance
Both businesses offer services such as towing, fuel delivery and repairs to recreational boaters with prepaid memberships. Sea Tow is a United States company incorporated in 1983. C-Tow was incorporated in British Columbia in 2006 and relied on earlier businesses’ use of its marks.
The parties largely agreed their marks were confusing. Their disagreement concerned who had enforceable Canadian rights and whether Sea Tow’s registrations could survive C-Tow’s challenge.
Sea Tow first applied to register its Canadian marks in 2002, but those applications were abandoned in 2010. Fresh applications filed in September 2010, based on registration and use in the United States, resulted in Canadian word and design registrations in February 2014.
C-Tow sought expungement in April 2022. Sea Tow then sued for relief including trademark infringement and passing off, and later sought summary judgment. The Federal Court heard C-Tow’s application and Sea Tow’s motion together.
In 2025 FC 27, the Federal Court struck the registrations for lack of entitlement and distinctiveness, rejected C-Tow’s separate bad-faith ground, and granted summary judgment in C-Tow’s favour. The appeal court noted that the lower court had not determined whether the motion’s outcome ended the action.
An abandoned application could not supply the earlier date
Because C-Tow challenged the registrations more than five years after registration, subsection 17(2) of the Trademarks Act was central. That provision gives longstanding registrations additional protection against challenges based on earlier use. But the protection can be defeated by showing that the registrant adopted its mark knowing of that earlier use.
The date of adoption therefore mattered. Sea Tow wanted to rely on its 2002 filings, or Canadian use through a Leamington franchise in 1987–1989, rather than its successful 2010 applications. The Federal Court’s finding that Sea Tow knew of C-Tow’s use by 1992 was not contested.
The appeal court rejected the attempt to rely on the abandoned filings. Reading section 3 with the provisions governing entitlement and registration, it found that the relevant application was the one that led to the registrations being challenged. The 2010 applications rested on foreign registration and use; they did not claim a Canadian first-use date. The court considered the entitlement provisions in force when those applications were filed. The earlier applications also concerned similar, but not identical, services.
The court likewise rejected Sea Tow’s reliance on the former franchise’s use. Abandonment requires both non-use and an intention to abandon, but intention may be inferred from prolonged disuse. The lower court was entitled to infer abandonment after the franchise’s demise, despite evidence of more recent use. A use-based trademark system did not preserve the claimed priority through abandoned use.
The appeal court also upheld the finding that C-Tow succeeded to Canadian use dating to 1985. The chain-of-title evidence was imperfect and contained short gaps, but the lower court had considered those weaknesses alongside corporate records and witness evidence. Sea Tow had not demonstrated an obvious error affecting the result.
One distinctiveness test, different burdens
Sea Tow argued that an existing registration should face a different, more demanding distinctiveness test in expungement proceedings than a proposed registration faces in opposition proceedings.
The court disagreed. The same statutory concept asks whether a mark distinguishes its owner’s goods or services from others. A competing mark must have a sufficiently substantial, significant or sufficient reputation in Canada to negate another mark’s distinctiveness. What changes between proceedings is the burden of proof, not the substantive test.
Here, C-Tow bore the burden of proving non-distinctiveness. The Federal Court had expressly recognized that burden; it had not improperly required Sea Tow to prove its own distinctiveness.
The lower court’s assessment of Canadian memberships, revenues and advertising supported its finding that C-Tow had a stronger and more sustained Canadian marketplace presence. The appeal court found no basis to overturn its conclusion that C-Tow’s reputation negated Sea Tow’s distinctiveness at the relevant April 2022 date.
Costs objections also failed
Sea Tow argued that C-Tow’s changing evidence and unsuccessful bad-faith allegation justified a different costs result. The appeal court found no error warranting intervention in the discretionary awards.
The lower court had considered the evidentiary changes and found no deliberate attempt to mislead. Sea Tow could have withdrawn its motion after receiving the updated evidence but chose to proceed. Nor did an unsuccessful statutory bad-faith ground automatically require a costs penalty.
All four appeals were dismissed. The court also directed the registry to demand release of the security bond in favour of C-Tow or its lawyers. The reasons do not establish that payment has occurred.
The ruling addresses the challenged registrations and the evidence supporting their removal. It should not be read as a general prohibition on every possible use of similar names or as deciding all remaining issues in the parties’ litigation.



