
The Supreme Court of Nova Scotia has refused to extend the deadline for a resident’s challenge to a lobster-handling facility’s development permit, finding that a substantial delay had not been adequately explained.
In Liu v. Halifax (Regional Municipality), 2026 NSSC 307, decided October 23, 2026, Justice Ann E. Smith denied Yue Liu’s application for more time to seek judicial review. The decision did not determine whether Halifax had correctly classified the proposed use under its land-use bylaw.
The case illustrates the distinction between pursuing concerns about a development through municipal channels and starting a court challenge within the applicable deadline. A genuine desire to contest an approval did not, on this record, overcome the unexplained delay in filing.
Dispute over a lobster facility
Halifax issued a development permit to NovaShell Wholesale Lobster Inc. on April 17, 2025, authorizing a variety store and a fishery-support use comprising a lobster holding tank and handling area. A July amendment adjusted the driveway, buildings and elevation drawings without changing the permitted uses.
Liu, a neighbouring property owner at Whynachts Cove, disputed the classification. She contended that the development was a fishery use rather than a fishery-support use permitted in the Mixed Rural Residential zone.
After observing construction in September, she contacted municipal representatives and sought information. The court found she knew about the approval no later than September 13, 2025. Municipal staff explained that the fishery-support use was permitted as of right, meaning it did not require a discretionary approval of the kind Liu anticipated.
At an October 24 meeting, Liu asked how to challenge the permit. A councillor directed her toward a planning-board appeal. She filed that appeal on October 30, but the Nova Scotia Regulatory and Appeals Board advised the next day that it lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal from approval of a development permit. It identified judicial review as a possible route.
Liu contacted a legal clinic in November and attended an appointment on December 11. She filed her notice of judicial review on January 23, 2026, and later sought an extension of time.
Awareness, not formal notice, started the clock
Civil Procedure Rule 7.05 generally requires a judicial-review notice within the earlier of 25 days after the decision is communicated and six months after it is made. The court held that communication does not require formal service or delivery of a copy: sufficient awareness of the decision can start the period.
The court had discretion to extend time. Relevant considerations included the length and explanation of the delay, a genuine intention to seek review, the proposed case’s merits and prejudice. Those factors were to be weighed flexibly in the interests of justice, rather than treated as a rigid checklist.
Liu’s genuine intention to challenge the approval weighed in her favour. But her delay was significant. Even measured from the July permit amendment, the six-month outside period had passed before she filed.
Waiting for fuller information, reasons or legal advice did not adequately explain the delay. The councillor’s direction to the wrong appeal body explained the short interval before the board corrected that advice, but not the remaining period. The court also found no compelling explanation for the delay after the legal-clinic appointment. Being self-represented did not itself supply one.
Potential merits did not overcome the delay
The judge considered the proposed grounds without deciding the underlying permit dispute. Halifax maintained that the bylaw’s fishery-support definition included retail and wholesale fish outlets and could reasonably encompass the lobster operation.
The challenge was not frivolous, but the court did not consider it particularly strong under the deferential reasonableness standard applicable to the permit decision. That factor weighed slightly against an extension.
Prejudice was neutral. NovaShell described construction spending and business consequences if its operation could not proceed. The court regarded much of that harm as arising from judicial review itself rather than from its lateness. Liu, meanwhile, would lose the opportunity to challenge the approval.
Balancing the factors, the judge found no exceptional or compelling basis to excuse the insufficiently explained delay. Finality mattered in an as-of-right permitting process. The extension was denied, and no costs were awarded because Halifax did not seek them.



