
The Supreme Court of Canada overturned an order requiring Ontario to disclose 23 mandate letters sent by the Premier to cabinet ministers in 2018, ruling that the letters revealed the substance of cabinet deliberations protected by provincial access-to-information law.
In Ontario (Attorney General) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), the court held that cabinet’s deliberative process extends beyond discussions at formal meetings. A premier’s initial instructions about policy priorities can form the beginning of that process, rather than a finished product standing outside it.
All seven judges agreed that the letters were exempt from disclosure. Justice Andromache Karakatsanis wrote for six judges in the February 2, 2024 decision. Justice Suzanne Côté agreed with the result but wrote separately about how courts should review the commissioner’s decision.
A request for the government’s starting priorities
A CBC journalist sought the letters delivered to ministers shortly after the government took office. They set out the Premier’s views on policy priorities for the government’s term. Cabinet Office refused access under section 12(1) of Ontario’s Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.
The section’s opening words require a refusal where disclosure would reveal the “substance of deliberations” of cabinet or its committees. Those words, rather than the provision’s additional list of specifically protected records, were at issue.
The Information and Privacy Commissioner ordered disclosure. He treated the letters as the product of the Premier’s own deliberations and as topics that might come before cabinet, rather than records revealing cabinet deliberations themselves. He also found insufficient support for the claim that the letters initiated a continuing deliberative process.
The Divisional Court and a majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld his decision as reasonable. Ontario then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Cabinet Office argued that the letters had been distributed at cabinet’s initial meeting, reflected the Premier’s inseparable role in setting cabinet priorities, and would reveal future deliberations about implementing those priorities. The CBC defended the commissioner’s assessment that the necessary connection had not been established. In the access proceedings, the broadcaster made its arguments without seeing the letters; the commissioner and reviewing judges had access to them.
Why confidentiality extends beyond the cabinet table
Karakatsanis began with the competing interests built into access legislation. Public information enables democratic participation and government accountability. Cabinet confidentiality, however, supports the collective responsibility of ministers, who must be able to debate privately and stand together publicly once decisions are announced.
The majority identified three reasons for that confidentiality: candour, ministerial solidarity and the efficiency of collective decision-making. It found that the commissioner had considered the first two but had not meaningfully addressed the third or the broader constitutional context of effective government.
Premature disclosure can expose developing priorities to pressure before cabinet has finished considering them, the majority explained. Decisions about when and how to announce policy are themselves part of the deliberative process. Treating every outcome of deliberations as automatically outside the exemption overlooks that context.
The majority also found a separate problem in how the commissioner applied the provision to these letters. The Premier’s priority-setting could not be artificially separated from the deliberations of cabinet as a whole. Cabinet decisions evolve through discussions among the Premier, individual ministers and other cabinet members, with advice from public servants. Those discussions can occur outside formal meetings.
Initial priorities can be revised, abandoned or approached differently. Comparing them with later public announcements or actual government action can reveal what happened during the deliberative process. The possibility that a priority never returned to a cabinet meeting therefore did not remove the protection: its abandonment could itself be revealing.
For the same reason, the letters could not be dismissed as mere agenda topics. They communicated the Premier’s initial views to colleagues as part of the policy-making process. To the extent the commissioner required evidence linking them to actual deliberations at a specific meeting, that requirement was too narrow.
The exemption still calls for examination of the record
The majority’s approach requires a substantive assessment of what disclosure would reveal in context. It does not turn solely on whether information is labelled a topic, decision or outcome. Even generally worded material can reveal deliberations when read alongside other available information.
The court accepted the importance of access to government information, but found that the legislature had given cabinet confidentiality priority where the exemption applies. On these facts, statutory text, context and purpose allowed only one reasonable result: the letters were protected. Sending the dispute back to the commissioner would serve no useful purpose.
Côté disputed the route to the result
The majority proceeded on reasonableness review, the deferential standard under which courts examine whether an administrative decision is justified in its legal and factual setting. It left unresolved whether correctness review was required, saying the commissioner’s decision failed even under the more deferential approach.
Côté considered that choice essential. In her view, the scope of cabinet privilege was a general legal question of central importance to the legal system, comparable to questions about parliamentary or solicitor-client privilege. It required a single, determinate answer through correctness review.
She agreed with the majority’s interpretation of the exemption but said it had effectively imposed its own interpretation as the measure of reasonableness. Disagreement with an administrative decision does not, by itself, make it unreasonable.
Côté pointed to the commissioner’s reliance on the statute’s promise of limited and specific exemptions, relevant court decisions and established administrative practice. She also questioned faulting him for not addressing an efficiency rationale that the Supreme Court had not previously articulated as such. Correctness review allowed her to reach the same disclosure result without endorsing the majority’s treatment of deference.
The court allowed Ontario’s appeal and set aside the disclosure order, with costs payable by the CBC. It expressly kept the private record of proceedings confidential and sealed. The ruling concerns the legal entitlement to disclosure under this request; it does not make the contents of that private record public.



