The Supreme Court of Canada has ruled that governments do not have absolute immunity from damages for unconstitutional legislation, allowing Joseph Power’s claim over changes to criminal record suspension eligibility to proceed under a demanding legal standard.

In Canada (Attorney General) v. Power, 2024 SCC 26, a five-judge majority dismissed Canada’s appeal on July 19, 2024. It held that damages may be available where legislation was clearly unconstitutional when enacted, or where its enactment involved bad faith or an abuse of power. Simply passing a law later found unconstitutional is insufficient.

The Court answered preliminary legal questions. It did not decide whether Power had proved his allegations, whether his claim met the threshold, or how much compensation he should receive. Four judges wrote or joined separate opinions proposing narrower liability or absolute immunity.

A record suspension and a damages claim

Power was convicted of two indictable offences in 1996 and served an eight-month sentence. He subsequently trained as a medical radiation technologist and worked at a New Brunswick hospital. His account, set out in his pleadings, was that his employer learned of his record in 2011, suspended him, and that he became unable to work in his field.

He applied for a record suspension in 2013. Before legislative changes, he could have applied five years after his release. Amendments introduced in 2010 and 2012 instead made him permanently ineligible, with transitional provisions applying the new rules to earlier offences.

Courts subsequently found those retrospective provisions unconstitutional. Canada conceded that the provisions infringed Charter protections against additional punishment and for the benefit of the lesser punishment, without justification. Power sued in 2018, seeking a declaration of invalidity and damages. He alleged that the legislation had been enacted in bad faith, through an abuse of power and with knowledge of its unconstitutionality.

Canada asked whether the Crown could be liable for officials and ministers preparing and drafting a bill later declared unconstitutional, or for Parliament enacting it. The New Brunswick courts answered yes. Canada maintained that constitutional protections for the legislative process required absolute immunity.

A high threshold, rather than automatic compensation

Chief Justice Richard Wagner and Justice Andromache Karakatsanis, writing for the majority, reaffirmed the limited immunity recognized in the Court’s 2002 Mackin decision. Good governance protects the state from damages merely because legislation is invalidated. That protection is not absolute.

The majority clarified that “clearly unconstitutional” is assessed objectively at the time of enactment, considering the nature and extent of the constitutional defect. A later ruling cannot by itself establish the threshold. Equally, an unprecedented but egregious Charter violation need not escape liability simply because courts had not previously decided an identical case.

Bad faith and abuse of power remain separate ways of overcoming immunity. Negligence does not suffice. The majority left fuller definitions for concrete cases, while identifying intentional misconduct and improper purposes as relevant concerns. Attributing an individual legislator’s conduct to the legislature itself would depend on the evidence. Vague allegations would not be enough.

These rules fit within the four-stage framework for Charter damages established in Vancouver (City) v. Ward. A claimant must first prove a rights breach, then show that damages would serve compensation, vindication of the right or deterrence. The state can then raise countervailing considerations, including good governance and alternative remedies. The final stage determines the amount.

Legislative immunity belongs at the third stage. Even after a claimant establishes a Charter breach and a reason for damages, the state remains protected unless the demanding threshold is met. A declaration that a law is invalid and a damages award can coexist where justified, but cannot produce duplicative relief. Invalidating a law does not necessarily compensate people already harmed by it.

Parliamentary privilege still limits the evidence

The majority rejected the argument that parliamentary sovereignty and the separation of powers categorically bar damages. Parliament exercises its authority within the Constitution, and courts have a constitutional role in providing remedies for rights violations. Limited liability after enactment, subject to a high threshold, could preserve legislative autonomy while holding the state accountable.

The claim was against the state. It did not impose personal liability on members of Parliament or make the state vicariously liable for individual legislators’ conduct. The unconstitutional law causes the rights breach; legislative conduct may inform whether damages are justified.

Parliamentary privilege nevertheless remains important. The majority did not authorize courts to compel legislators to testify about protected proceedings. A claimant must establish the case using admissible evidence that does not violate privilege. Documents or other material outside the protected sphere may be available, but the scope of privilege requires attention to the particular evidence. In some cases, it could prevent a claimant from obtaining the evidence needed to succeed.

The majority also declined to define precisely the boundary between executive and legislative conduct before enactment. Although it answered both questions yes, it treated them as raising the overarching issue of absolute immunity. Power’s allegations focused on enactment, and the parties had not fully argued the boundaries of liability for earlier conduct.

Two different objections to the majority’s approach

Justice Mahmud Jamal, joined by Justice Nicholas Kasirer, would have answered the preparation-and-drafting question no. In their view, established parliamentary privileges protect that work, including legislative functions performed by ministers and officials outside the parliamentary chamber. Privilege limits the court’s jurisdiction; it is not simply another consideration to balance when deciding damages.

They would nevertheless permit damages for the enactment of clearly unconstitutional legislation. Their proposed test was narrower: unconstitutionality must have been readily or obviously demonstrable at enactment and beyond serious debate. An earlier binding decision on indistinguishable facts was not essential.

Jamal rejected bad faith and abuse of power as additional grounds. Those inquiries would draw courts into protected legislative motives and proceedings. His distinction was between the protected process of making legislation and an enacted law’s unconstitutional consequences. He also distinguished the Crown’s legislative role from its executive capacity, in which it could answer for those consequences.

Justice Malcolm Rowe, joined by Justice Suzanne Côté, would have answered both questions no. They considered absolute immunity necessary for preparation, drafting and enactment alike. Parliamentary privilege is itself constitutional, they reasoned, and cannot be subordinated to the Charter’s remedial provision.

Rowe also rejected treating the executive Crown as liable for Parliament’s legislative work. In his view, neither the majority’s threshold nor Jamal’s narrower test adequately avoided judicial scrutiny of protected proceedings. Looking back at what legislators should have understood could chill debate, discourage new legislative responses to court rulings and upset the relationship between courts and legislatures.

That position would not prevent courts from invalidating legislation or reviewing executive action taken under it. Rowe pointed to judicial review of the refusal of Power’s record suspension as a potential remedy consistent with parliamentary privilege.

The majority’s decision governs. Canada’s appeal was dismissed with costs, leaving Power able to pursue his damages claim subject to the constitutional threshold, evidentiary limits and remaining requirements for relief.

Source: Canada (Attorney General) v. Power, 2024 SCC 26.