The Supreme Court of Canada has drawn a distinction between recovering the proceeds of securities misconduct and collecting regulatory penalties when deciding which debts survive a bankruptcy discharge.

In Poonian v. British Columbia (Securities Commission), 2024 SCC 28, the Court held that approximately $5.6 million in disgorgement orders against Thalbinder Singh Poonian and Shailu Poonian would survive any future discharge. But a five-judge majority found that their $13.5 million in administrative penalties did not fall within either of the two bankruptcy exceptions argued on appeal.

The July 31 ruling allowed the appeal in part without costs. It did not grant the Poonians a discharge or cancel the penalties. Their earlier application for discharge had been refused, and the Court emphasized that bankruptcy judges retain a separate power to refuse or impose conditions on a discharge.

Justice Suzanne Côté wrote for the majority. Justice Andromache Karakatsanis, joined by Justice Sheilah Martin, would have held that both categories of debt survived discharge.

A market-manipulation scheme led to two kinds of orders

The securities commission found that the Poonians and their associates manipulated trading in OSE Corp., a public oil and gas company, between 2007 and 2009. They used transactions among themselves, pseudonyms and nominee accounts to inflate the share price, then sold overpriced shares to investors.

The commission imposed administrative penalties of $10 million on Thalbinder Poonian and $3.5 million on Shailu Poonian. It also ordered them to give up amounts obtained through the scheme: $1,319,167 and a further $1,126,260 owed jointly and severally with another participant by Thalbinder Poonian, and $3,149,935 by Shailu Poonian.

Those disgorgement amounts total $5,595,362. They represent gains from the misconduct, rather than an additional penalty calculated to punish or deter it.

After the Poonians entered bankruptcy, the commission sought a declaration that its debts could not be released by any eventual discharge. The lower courts protected both the penalties and disgorgement orders, although they disagreed about which statutory exceptions applied.

Registering a regulatory order does not make it court-imposed

One exception, section 178(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, covers specified fines, penalties, restitution orders and similar orders imposed by a court in respect of an offence.

The Supreme Court rejected the argument that this provision is confined to criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings. Its language and legislative history support a broader reach. But the requirement that the order be imposed by a court remained decisive.

The commission had registered its orders with the Supreme Court of British Columbia, allowing them to be enforced as court judgments. That did not change who made them. A court’s passive role in registration was different from actively imposing a penalty or order.

All seven judges agreed that neither category of commission debt qualified under this exception. An administrative tribunal or regulator is not a court for this purpose.

Fraud must be proved, and linked to the particular debt

The other exception, section 178(1)(e), concerns debts resulting from obtaining property or services by false pretences or fraudulent misrepresentation.

Côté identified three requirements: deceit, a transfer of property or provision of services, and the necessary link between that wrongdoing and the debt. A creditor cannot simply presume fraud. When relying on an administrative tribunal’s findings, the bankruptcy court must examine the record and make its own determination that the exception applies.

Here, the required fraud finding was established. The Poonians had knowingly misrepresented the share price to obtain money, and the chambers judge had assessed the commission’s findings rather than merely accepting a label.

The Court also rejected two proposed limits on the exception. The bankrupt need not personally receive or retain the property: funds can pass to an associated person at the bankrupt’s direction or on their behalf. Nor must the creditor seeking protection be the direct victim. The commission could invoke the exception even though investors, rather than the regulator, had relied on the misleading conduct.

Disgorgement had the direct connection the penalties lacked

For the majority, the remaining question was whether each debt directly represented the value obtained through the deceit.

The disgorgement orders met that test. They required the Poonians to surrender funds gained through their fraudulent market manipulation. The link between the conduct, the money obtained and the debt was direct.

The administrative penalties were different. They arose from the commission’s decision to sanction the misconduct, rather than directly from the acquisition of the investors’ money. A connection showing that the penalties would not exist without the fraud was insufficient under the majority’s interpretation.

Côté stressed that the statutory exceptions are narrowly defined. They do not preserve every debt associated with objectionable behaviour. She also rejected treating punitive damages as protected by this particular exception merely because they punish fraud; other bankruptcy provisions may still prevent their release.

Two judges would have protected the penalties too

Karakatsanis agreed that a direct causal connection was necessary and that a weak association with fraud would not suffice. Her disagreement concerned the majority’s additional limit tying the protected debt to the value of the property obtained.

She found no such monetary ceiling in the statutory text. In her view, administrative penalties imposed specifically for the fraudulent conduct arose directly from it, much as punitive damages can arise from a civil wrong. Their deterrent purpose did not sever that connection.

The dissent distinguished a regulator’s hearing costs, which arise from the proceeding itself, from sanctions targeting the underlying deceit. It would have preserved both the penalties and disgorgement orders to prevent dishonest debtors from escaping liabilities directly caused by their misconduct.

The ruling did not itself release any debt

The majority’s decision concerned which debts would necessarily survive a future discharge. It left the disgorgement orders protected and removed that protection for the administrative penalties under the exceptions before the Court. It did not decide a new discharge application or establish that money had been recovered or returned to investors.

The Poonians later sought an amendment of the judgment or a rehearing. The Court dismissed that motion on November 28, 2024, with costs to the commission, according to the official docket.

Source: Supreme Court of Canada judgment and case docket.