
A divided Quebec Court of Appeal has upheld a bankruptcy trustee’s right to claim half of a condominium under a registered ownership transfer, despite a private agreement stating that the bankrupt person had never truly owned it.
In Syndic de la Succession d’Imbeault, 2026 QCCA 1414, the majority held that the trustee could rely on the apparent transaction as a third person acting in good faith under the Civil Code of Québec. Justice Stephen Hamilton dissented on that central issue, saying the law should protect people who relied on the appearance to their detriment, rather than confer an unearned benefit on creditors.
The October 26 ruling nevertheless gave condo owner Serge Carrière a limited monetary victory. The court ordered the trustee to return $12,595.23 arising from mortgage payments he had made after Luc Imbeault’s death, with legal interest from September 25, 2018. The remaining trial orders stood, and appeal costs were imposed against Carrière.
A public transfer and a private agreement
In 2011, Imbeault was in financial difficulty and owed Carrière, a longtime friend, $90,000. Carrière transferred an undivided half-interest in his condo to Imbeault for $1. They jointly obtained a $245,000 mortgage loan, and both the transfer and mortgage were registered.
The arrangement allowed Imbeault to repay debts, including the debt to Carrière, while Carrière refinanced an existing mortgage. But the men also agreed privately that Carrière would remain the sole real owner. Their agreement was subsequently notarized as a counter letter and was not registered on title.
Imbeault agreed to make mortgage payments until his portion of the debt was repaid. The men also arranged life insurance to secure the loan. Carrière continued living alone in the condo and paying its occupancy expenses; Imbeault never lived there.
After Imbeault died in 2017, his estate entered bankruptcy. The trustee registered bankruptcy documents against the property in spring 2018, relying on the public title. Carrière provided the notarized counter letter in May 2019 and sought removal of those registrations.
The Superior Court accepted the trustee’s claim to half of the property. It allowed Carrière to buy out that interest on specified terms, failing which the condo could be sold and its net proceeds divided equally. Carrière challenged that result and the rejection of his reimbursement claims.
Why the majority allowed reliance on the registered transfer
Justice Alexandre Boucher, joined by Justice Frédéric Bachand, distinguished the parties’ rights against each other from the rights of outsiders.
Article 1451 of the Civil Code recognizes a simulation: an apparent contract conceals the parties’ true agreement in a counter letter. The counter letter prevails between those parties. Article 1452, however, allows third persons in good faith to rely on either agreement according to their interest.
Carrière argued that a bankruptcy trustee cannot acquire greater rights in property than the bankrupt person possessed. Since Imbeault was not the real owner, he said, the trustee could not take the condo interest.
The majority answered that a trustee has two functions: administering the bankrupt person’s property and representing creditors in its liquidation. Supreme Court precedents involving unregistered leases and conditional sales did not resolve this different situation. Here, article 1452 expressly permitted reliance on a simulated transfer.
The trustee was exercising that statutory right for creditors, rather than merely inheriting Imbeault’s rights under the private agreement. The majority said the provision lets an outsider invoke the apparent contract affirmatively, not simply defend against the secret agreement. Its text does not distinguish between an apparent transfer into a debtor’s estate and an apparent transfer out of it.
That protection puts the risks of creating a false appearance on the people who created it. The majority also cautioned that describing the trustee as a co-owner did not make its status identical to ordinary co-ownership: its powers arose in the bankruptcy context.
Later disclosure did not undo good faith
Carrière also argued that the trustee knew about the counter letter before starting litigation and therefore could not rely on good faith.
The majority focused instead on the trustee’s earlier conduct. It had not participated in the arrangement and did not know about the counter letter when it registered its bankruptcy documents in 2018. Sending the agreement afterward could not retroactively remove its right to rely on the apparent transfer.
Nor did article 1452 require the trustee to prove that reliance had caused it a loss. The majority read the provision as protecting an advantage acquired in good faith as well as preventing harm. It distinguished a tax precedent involving a taxpayer who consistently asserted the underlying reality, whereas the men here had created and maintained a registered appearance contrary to their private agreement.
The dissent required detrimental reliance
Hamilton agreed that disclosure just before litigation would not automatically destroy an already-acquired right. His disagreement concerned whether the trustee had such a right in the first place.
In his view, the condo interest had never entered Imbeault’s actual estate, and the trustee could not become its owner merely by taking over that estate. Article 1452 should protect outsiders misled into changing their position, not punish every simulation or enrich people unaffected by it.
The bank had relied on the apparent transfer but had been fully repaid through insurance. No other creditor was shown to have relied on the apparent ownership. The trustee’s initial registrations could justify defending those acts, Hamilton reasoned, but did not entitle it to half the property’s value.
He also warned that distributing the apparent asset among all creditors could dilute protection for a creditor who actually relied on the representation. He would have declared Carrière the sole owner and ordered removal of the bankruptcy registrations. That position did not command a majority.
Two reimbursement claims, different outcomes
The majority upheld rejection of Carrière’s claim for $50,022.50, representing half the condo expenses he said he had paid. Neither agreement required Imbeault to share those expenses, Carrière had occupied the condo alone, and the claim did not establish repayment of money paid by mistake or without being owed.
The $12,595.23 claim was different. Insurance paid the mortgage balance calculated at Imbeault’s death, plus accrued interest, but Carrière had kept making payments while awaiting that payout. After the bank discharged the remaining loan and applied some surplus to other debts, it sent the balance to the trustee.
The majority found that surplus belonged to Carrière and had apparently reached the trustee by mistake. His claim was directly against the recipient of that money, not against Imbeault’s estate. All three judges agreed the sum should be returned; the binding order sets interest from September 25, 2018. The judgment does not establish that repayment or a property sale has occurred.



