Canada’s standardized compensation rules for disrupted international flights can operate alongside the Montreal Convention, the Supreme Court of Canada has ruled, rejecting an airline industry challenge to the federal passenger-protection regime.

In International Air Transport Association v. Canada (Transportation Agency), 2024 SCC 30, the Court unanimously dismissed the appeal on October 4, 2024. Justice Malcolm Rowe distinguished statutory payments owed under a consumer-protection scheme from damages assessed according to an individual passenger’s loss.

That distinction defeated the airlines’ argument that the regulations conflicted with an international treaty governing air-carrier liability. The decision preserved the challenged compensation scheme; it did not award money to particular passengers or find that every flight disruption requires compensation.

The Court also clarified when judges may receive expert evidence about international law, rejecting a fixed rule that would exclude it in every case.

What the airlines challenged

The International Air Transport Association, Airlines for America and 16 carriers challenged provisions of the Air Passenger Protection Regulations governing international flights. The disputed rules addressed standardized compensation for delay, cancellation and denied boarding, together with refunds of baggage fees for lost or damaged baggage.

Under the regime examined by the Court, disruption compensation applied when the cause was within the carrier’s control and was not required for safety. For cancellations and delays, the rules also required notice to the passenger 14 days or less before the flight. Payment amounts depended on the delay in arrival at the destination and, for delay or cancellation, the carrier’s size.

The carriers argued that these obligations exceeded the Canadian Transportation Agency’s authority because they conflicted with the Montreal Convention, which Parliament had incorporated into Canadian law through the Carriage by Air Act.

Article 29 of the Convention makes any “action for damages” subject to its conditions and liability limits. The airlines contended that this exclusivity prevented Canada from requiring the additional compensation.

The Attorney General of Canada and the Agency answered that the regulations created standardized consumer entitlements outside the Convention’s damages regime. They also advanced alternative arguments about the treaty’s coverage and Parliament’s legislative intent, which the Supreme Court ultimately did not need to decide.

A fixed entitlement differs from an individual damages claim

The Convention balances protections for passengers and carriers. It provides presumptions of carrier liability in specified circumstances while imposing conditions and limits on damages claims. Its exclusivity is important within that field, Rowe explained, but it does not comprehensively regulate every aspect of international air travel.

Reading the treaty’s wording, context, history and purpose, the Court concluded that an “action for damages” concerns proceedings with the characteristics of a judicial action seeking compensation tied to an individual injury or loss. Such proceedings need not necessarily occur in a traditional court.

The passenger regulations worked differently. A claimant did not have to establish the amount of harm personally suffered to receive the standardized payment. Rowe illustrated the point with two passengers on a delayed flight: one might use the layover to visit a relative, while another suffers considerable inconvenience. Their entitlement under the rules could nevertheless be the same.

Likewise, a baggage-fee refund reflected the fee charged, rather than a calculation of the passenger’s individual loss. That refund accompanied the compensation for lost or damaged baggage available under the Convention.

The statutory scheme also lacked the Convention’s due-diligence and contributory-negligence defences to an otherwise payable amount. The Agency could enforce the obligations through its complaint process and extend a compensation finding to other passengers affected by the same disruption.

European and American decisions supported the distinction between individualized damages and standardized protection. The Court did not make the outcome depend on a disputed finding that compensation schemes adopted by 73 treaty parties constituted relevant state practice. Even assuming they did not, the treaty’s text, purpose and other interpretive materials supported the result.

Nor did the Court’s earlier decision in Thibodeau resolve this question in the airlines’ favour. That case concerned individualized damages for language-rights violations and had expressly left the standardized-compensation distinction open.

Why the two regimes can stand together

Because the Convention had been implemented in Canadian legislation, the Court applied the ordinary test for statutory conflict: the provisions would have to be so inconsistent that they could not stand together. Addressing related subject matter was insufficient.

The regulations fell outside Article 29’s restriction on damages actions. Passengers retained the Convention’s protections for individual claims, and carriers retained its liability limits within that field. Canada had not surrendered its ability to prescribe minimum passenger treatment as a condition of access to its air-travel market.

The Court rejected two additional airline arguments. Calling the payments “non-compensatory damages” did not bring them within Article 29: that expression refers to a subset of damages in an action governed by the provision, not every statutory payment.

Nor would enforcing a regulatory entitlement in court transform it into damages. Even assuming such a proceeding was an “action,” the claim would still seek payment of an existing standardized entitlement rather than compensation calculated from individual harm.

Expert evidence remains subject to judicial scrutiny

The litigation also raised disagreement over expert affidavits concerning international law and state practice. The Supreme Court distinguished international law, which Canadian courts treat as law, from foreign domestic law, ordinarily pleaded and proved as fact.

It directed courts to apply the established Mohan framework. Expert evidence must meet threshold requirements of relevance, necessity, an appropriately qualified expert and the absence of an exclusionary rule. Judges then weigh the benefits of admitting it against the risks.

An expert may assist with matters such as treaty practice, foreign-language texts or contested international customs. But the judge must still decide the law, and an affidavit that merely repackages counsel’s argument is not admissible expert assistance. Where expertise is unnecessary, judges can decide the issue using submissions and legal authorities.

What the decision left open

The Federal Court of Appeal had invalidated the regulation concerning “temporary loss” of baggage because the Agency lacked the necessary statutory authority. The government and Agency did not appeal that ruling. The Supreme Court’s dismissal did not restore that provision.

The airlines also did not pursue the lower court’s rejection of their extraterritoriality argument. And the Supreme Court did not decide whether cancellation and denied boarding fall outside the Convention’s concept of delay, or whether Parliament intended to override the treaty if a conflict existed. Neither alternative was necessary once the Court found the regimes compatible.

Costs were awarded to the Attorney General of Canada. The Agency did not seek costs and received none. The ruling concerned the validity of the challenged scheme, leaving individual passengers’ entitlement to be determined under the applicable rules and facts.

Source: Supreme Court of Canada judgment.