
The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Federal Child Support Guidelines against a father’s challenge while rejecting an unusually deferential test courts had used to assess whether governments exceeded their regulation-making powers.
In Auer v. Auer, 2024 SCC 36, a unanimous decision released November 8, 2024, the court ruled that federal cabinet acted within the authority Parliament granted under the Divorce Act. It rejected five objections to the guidelines’ treatment of parental income, government benefits, parenting time and additional expenses.
Justice Suzanne Côté, writing for all nine judges, also confirmed that the robust reasonableness review established in Vavilov generally governs challenges to the legal validity of regulations and other delegated legislation. Challengers no longer have to show that a regulation is “irrelevant,” “extraneous” or “completely unrelated” to its parent statute’s purpose.
That change did not rescue Roland Auer’s case. The appeal was dismissed with costs to Aysel Igorevna Auer.
Joint responsibility does not require equal contributions
The Auers divorced in 2008, and their child lived with Ms. Auer. Mr. Auer paid support but argued that the guidelines required paying parents to shoulder too much of their children’s costs. His judicial review challenged the federal government’s authority to establish the scheme; it was not an appeal fixing an individual support amount. Separate support applications were before the Alberta court when the Supreme Court decided the case.
Section 26.1 of the Divorce Act gives cabinet broad authority to make child-support guidelines. It also requires them to rest on the principle that spouses share a financial obligation to maintain their children according to their relative abilities to contribute.
The court held that this constraint is mandatory but does not demand equal financial contributions or prescribe a particular method for estimating costs. Parliament left cabinet considerable room to design a predictable national framework.
The guidelines generally combine a table amount, based on the paying parent’s income and the number of children, with any special or extraordinary expenses a court awards. They seek to let children continue benefiting from their parents’ means after separation, rather than simply calculate a fixed list of needs and divide that bill.
Why the five challenges failed
Mr. Auer first objected that the basic tables do not expressly account for the receiving parent’s income. The court explained that the formula assumes that a parent living with the child contributes proportionately through their shared household and standard of living. Cabinet was authorized to adopt that approach; the omission of the recipient’s income from the table calculation did not mean the recipient contributed nothing.
Second, Mr. Auer challenged the assumption that spending on children rises as a constant percentage of income, without adjusting for a child’s age. The court found cabinet could choose that model. Judges also have discretion to depart from the table treatment of income above $150,000 when the resulting amount is inappropriate. Mr. Auer’s concern that judges rarely use that discretion did not establish that the guidelines themselves were unlawful.
Third, he argued that government child benefits should reduce the amount payable because they improve the receiving household’s finances. The court held that cabinet could exclude those benefits when defining income for the tables. The scheme treats them as the government’s contribution to children, helping improve their circumstances rather than reducing the paying parent’s obligation.
Fourth, Mr. Auer attacked the treatment of direct spending by parents with less than 40 per cent of annual parenting time. The guidelines’ shared-parenting provisions apply when each parent has at least 40 per cent, allowing consideration of both table amounts, additional shared-parenting costs and the parties’ circumstances.
The court held cabinet could draw that threshold. A joint support obligation did not require each parent to pay exactly half the costs. It also pointed to the separate undue-hardship provision, which can address unusually high expenses associated with exercising parenting time. The court did not find that paying parents generally overcontribute.
Finally, Mr. Auer said adding special or extraordinary expenses could count costs already reflected in the tables twice. The court rejected the premise that the legislation permits only a strict allocation of predetermined needs. Cabinet could authorize a scheme that lets children benefit from parental income and allows additional expenses where justified.
That does not make every claimed extra payable. A parent seeking special expenses must establish that they are necessary in relation to the child’s best interests and reasonable in light of the family’s means and earlier spending pattern. The paying parent can argue that an expense is already covered; the court decides whether the additional award is justified.
A more searching review of regulations
The broader administrative-law issue arose because the Alberta Court of Appeal had divided over how Vavilov affected the earlier Katz Group decision. Its majority treated cabinet regulations differently from rules made by administrative bodies or municipalities, applying the highly deferential “irrelevant,” “extraneous” or “completely unrelated” threshold.
The Supreme Court rejected that distinction. Regulations derive authority from the statute empowering their maker, not from the maker’s identity or proximity to Parliament. Reasonableness is the presumptive standard, subject to legislative direction or recognized exceptions requiring correctness review, including constitutional questions.
Courts must ask whether the regulation falls within a reasonable interpretation of the delegated power, considering the statute’s text, context and purpose, along with other applicable legal constraints. They do not begin by imposing their own preferred interpretation of the legislation.
Several Katz Group principles survive. Regulations remain presumed valid, the challenger bears the burden of proving invalidity, and courts should reconcile a regulation with its enabling statute where possible. What falls away is the exceptionally high threshold that could insulate regulations insufficiently connected to statutory authority.
Legality remains different from policy preference
The court emphasized that reasonableness review does not authorize judges to decide whether a regulation is wise, necessary or effective. Consequences matter insofar as they help determine whether the legislature authorized a rule with those consequences.
Nor does the absence of formal reasons prevent review. Courts can examine the record, policy statements, debates or regulatory impact analyses to understand the exercise of delegated power, while keeping the focus on statutory authority.
For the child-support challenge, that distinction was decisive: disagreement with cabinet’s chosen formula did not establish that it had exceeded Parliament’s broad authorization.
The decision concerned the scheme challenged in 2024. Justice Canada subsequently updated the federal tables effective October 1, 2025, using more recent tax rules. Its guidance says the new amounts do not automatically change existing support orders.
Source: Supreme Court of Canada, 2024 SCC 36.



