A Newfoundland and Labrador planning adjudicator has upheld Torbay’s order to remove a school bus from a residential property while rejecting the town’s argument that parking the bus constituted development.

In Robert Lacey/Dawn McGrath v Town of Torbay, appeal 15-006-094-032, signed May 30, 2026, adjudicator Mary Bishop confirmed the removal requirement under the town’s Property Standards and Maintenance Bylaw. She reversed the development-based ground and directed Torbay to amend and reissue its order.

The split outcome turns on the distinction between an ordinary vehicle used for transportation and a vehicle adapted to another use, as well as the separate application of a municipal parking rule. It does not establish a general right to park buses on residential land.

A parking dispute pursued through development rules

Lacey and McGrath challenged a removal order that relied on several statutory and regulatory provisions. They argued that emissions complaints were unsubstantiated, questioned the complainant’s connection to adjoining property and alleged selective enforcement because buses and other commercial vehicles were parked at other residential properties in town.

Torbay responded that it investigated and acted when complaints were received. Its planning director said the town did not want large commercial vehicles in residential areas because of concerns about noise, traffic and neighbourhood appearance. The validity of the appeal and compliance with procedures for serving the order were not disputed.

Bishop accepted that the town had statutory authority to issue enforcement orders. Section 102 of the Urban and Rural Planning Act, 2000 concerns development inconsistent with municipal planning instruments, while section 285 of the Towns and Local Service Districts Act authorizes orders addressing contraventions of legislation, regulations or bylaws. The question was whether the particular grounds cited supported this order.

The development definition reproduced in the reasons covers operations on land and material changes in its use or intensity of use. It also specifically addresses parking trailers or vehicles used to sell refreshments or merchandise, as offices or as living accommodation. The building definition includes mobile structures and vehicles adapted or constructed for residential, commercial, industrial or similar uses.

Bishop rejected Torbay’s attempt to fit this bus within those provisions. It was not being used as a shop, office or accommodation, and it had not been altered or adapted away from its intended purpose of transporting people. Treating its parking on a vacant lot as development stretched the legislation’s intended reach, she concluded.

Home-business conditions did not apply

The town’s order also cited conditions for home businesses in its Residential Medium Density zone. Those conditions addressed effects such as noise, odour and fumes and restricted regular commercial-vehicle parking, subject to an exception for one vehicle with a gross weight of no more than one tonne.

There was no evidence that parking the bus was connected to a home-business use. The planning director acknowledged that the home-business conditions included in the order did not apply. Bishop found that the zone provisions did not otherwise address commercial-vehicle parking and that Torbay had wrongly treated what was essentially a parking issue as development.

The appellants’ selective-enforcement argument did not produce a finding that the town had adopted an unlawful enforcement policy. Torbay acknowledged that commercial vehicles were parked at residential properties elsewhere and said enforcement occurred in response to complaints. Bishop noted that no evidence established whether this approach formed part of an adopted enforcement policy.

Property-standards rule sustained removal

A separate provision supplied a valid basis for removal. Section 6.5 of the Property Standards and Maintenance Bylaw prohibits parking a vehicle on residential property beyond the building line unless it is in an approved driveway or parking space.

Bishop acknowledged that no evidence showed whether the bus was beyond a building line. However, the lot had not been approved for development, contained no building and therefore had no building line; no driveway had been approved either. She upheld the town’s application of section 6.5 and emphasized that it applies to all vehicles.

The reasons also distinguished possible enforcement tools from those actually used. A technical report identified provisions in the town’s Noise and Nuisance Bylaw that might address the matter, but that bylaw was not cited in the removal order, even though it appeared in related correspondence.

Under section 44 of the planning legislation, an adjudicator may confirm, reverse or vary an appealed decision and direct implementation, subject to statutory limits, including a prohibition on overruling a discretionary municipal decision. Bishop accepted the town’s discretion to decide that commercial vehicles should not park in residential areas for the reasons it advanced, while rejecting its interpretation of the development provisions in this case.

Bishop suggested that a commercial-vehicle parking bylaw, or clearer provisions in the municipal plan and development regulations, could address these issues more directly. That was a suggestion for clearer regulation, not an order requiring the town to enact a new bylaw.

The operative order confirmed removal under section 6.5, struck the development-based ground and required a corrected order to be reissued. The reasons do not establish that the bus was subsequently removed or that the amended order was issued. They identify a right to appeal on a question of law or jurisdiction to the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador within 10 days after the appellants receive the decision.