
Terminal operators challenging Vancouver’s gateway infrastructure fee have lost an appeal seeking a wider certified record from the port authority, after the Federal Court of Appeal held that the record generally follows the actual decision-maker rather than every employee involved in developing a proposal.
In Pacific Coast Terminals Co. Ltd. v. Vancouver Fraser Port Authority, 2026 FCA 156, released September 18, 2026, the court dismissed the operators’ appeal and allowed the authority’s cross-appeal, both with costs. The ruling resolves a document-production dispute within the judicial review. It does not decide whether the infrastructure fee itself is lawful.
A fee challenge becomes a dispute over the record
Pacific Coast Terminals, Viterra Canada, Cascadia Port Management, Fraser Grain Terminal and Alliance Grain Terminal operate shipping and bulk-commodity facilities within the Port of Vancouver.
The port authority began planning infrastructure improvements in 2017. A team of staff and outside consultants examined project costs and the fees needed to support them. A proposed tonnage-based fee announced in October 2021 led to an initial judicial-review application. After further disclosure, consultations and postponements, that application was discontinued.
The authority’s board approved the eventual fee on September 13, 2022. It had two documents before it: a summary report covering the studies, financial work and consultations, and a draft resolution. The fee took effect on January 1, 2023.
The operators launched a new challenge, alleging that the fees were unfair, unreasonable and discriminatory, and that the consultation process denied them information needed to respond meaningfully. Those remain allegations in the underlying proceeding, not findings in this appeal.
They requested documents under rule 317 of the Federal Courts Rules, including consultants’ studies, funding proposals and materials linking terminals and projects to particular trade areas. The port supplied 217 documents totalling approximately 4,000 pages, but withheld some requested material because it was not considered by the board, did not exist or was not relevant.
Who actually made the decision?
An associate judge ordered broader production. A Federal Court judge reversed that order but sent back the question whether procedural-fairness allegations justified producing the disputed documents. The operators appealed, while the authority challenged that referral back.
Writing for a unanimous appeal panel, Justice Donald Rennie explained that rule 317 is not a substitute for discovery in a civil lawsuit. Its starting point is the material actually before the administrative decision-maker, relevant to the decision identified in the judicial-review application.
The decision-maker here was the board of directors. The Canada Marine Act makes the board responsible for managing the port authority’s activities, and ordinary corporate-law principles explain how a corporation acts through its board. Staff work supporting a decision does not automatically make every staff member part of the decision-maker.
The court placed no weight on an affidavit offering an opinion that only the board had legal authority to impose the fee. That was a legal question for the court, not admissible opinion evidence from the witness. The conclusion instead rested on the governing law and the record.
Nor did the summary report automatically pull every underlying study into the certified record. The lengthy planning process did not establish the kind of continuing course of conduct relied on by the operators: only the September 2022 fee decision affected their legal rights or interests.
Fairness allegations did not justify sending the issue back
A procedural-fairness or bias claim can justify a broader record, but the requested documents must be relevant to that claim. The appeal court found no legal basis for relevance to the fairness arguments as framed here, and there was no allegation of bias.
The operators could argue from their own knowledge and experience that they had been denied a fair opportunity to participate. Their legitimate-expectations argument likewise turned on what they were told about the process and how the process actually unfolded. Documents they did not possess could not resolve that comparison.
The court therefore allowed the authority’s cross-appeal rather than leave the issue for reconsideration. The authority’s earlier decision to provide more than the minimum record did not change the legal requirements of rule 317.
A narrow record is not immunity from review
The court rejected the suggestion that limiting the certified record necessarily shields decisions from scrutiny. Evidence that an apparent decision-maker consulted a higher authority can justify including material before that authority. Courts also have limited powers to require further material and may draw adverse inferences from missing evidence after the parties exchange affidavits.
Those safeguards do not authorize discovery merely because additional material might help. At the same time, a decision cannot survive reasonableness review if the record is too thin to permit meaningful scrutiny. Administrative bodies also cannot use later affidavits to invent new explanations for a decision after it is challenged.
The practical distinction is between defining the original certified record and deciding whether the administrative decision can ultimately be justified on the evidence. The operators lost this attempt to expand the former; the appeal did not resolve the latter.



