The Federal Court has ordered the Canadian Human Rights Commission to reconsider its refusal to deal with a former correctional employee’s complaint. The Commission had blamed Rodney Foster for withdrawing workplace grievances without considering whether the decision was attributable to his paralegal’s advice, Justice Michael Battista ruled.

The November 13 decision in Foster v. Canada (Attorney General), 2026 FC 1401, set aside the Commission’s refusal and awarded Foster $2,500 in costs. It did not decide his allegations of discrimination or find that his former representative had been incompetent.

Grievances withdrawn on advice

Foster worked for Correctional Service Canada for approximately 27 years. CSC investigated his performance in 2016 and terminated his employment on November 21, 2017. Two grievances were filed on his behalf the following month. He also filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination based on disability and race, preserving the one-year filing period.

In November 2018, the Commission warned that it might refuse to hear the complaint if he did not exhaust the grievance process. The Canadian Human Rights Act permits the Commission to decline a complaint where the complainant ought to complete grievance or review procedures otherwise reasonably available.

Frustrated by the grievance process’s slow pace, Foster retained a licensed paralegal in March 2022. She advised him to withdraw the grievances and concentrate on his human rights complaint. He instructed his union accordingly, and the grievances were withdrawn and scheduled hearings cancelled.

When the paralegal tried to reactivate the complaint, the Commission asked about the grievances. It declined to proceed on March 19, 2025, because Foster had not exhausted that process.

The missing statutory inquiry

Battista found that the Commission had misapplied a safeguard in section 42(2) of the Act. Before refusing to deal with a complaint because another procedure has not been exhausted, it must satisfy itself that the failure was attributable to the complainant rather than someone else.

The Attorney General argued that the Commission had fulfilled this requirement. Its officer’s report, adopted as the decision’s reasons, recognized both the union and the paralegal as Foster’s representatives. The officer concluded that Foster had not reasonably explained the withdrawal and had made the decision himself, rather than the union.

That analysis was incomplete, Battista held. Once the Commission recognized that Foster had two representatives, it could not examine only whether the union was responsible. It also needed to consider whether the failure to finish the grievance process was attributable to the paralegal. The Attorney General conceded that the statutory reference to someone else extended beyond a complainant’s bargaining agent.

Foster had sought relief on the basis of incompetent representation. He argued that the paralegal failed to advise him about seeking a court order to address the delay or the risk that withdrawal would prevent the Commission from hearing his complaint. He also faulted her for not re-engaging the grievance process once a hearing date was set. The Attorney General disputed both the availability of that form of relief and the allegation of incompetence.

The judge did not resolve those arguments. The Commission’s failure to apply the statutory requirement was enough to make its decision unreasonable. The matter returns to the Commission for reconsideration under that requirement, with Foster’s discrimination allegations still undecided.

Read the Federal Court’s reasons on CanLII.