
Prison disciplinary charges carrying the possibility of segregation or loss of earned remission must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled on March 14, 2025, rejecting Saskatchewan’s use of the lower civil standard for those offences.
In John Howard Society of Saskatchewan v. Saskatchewan (Attorney General), 2025 SCC 6, six judges concluded that the province’s rule violated the Charter’s protection of the presumption of innocence. The Court allowed the society’s appeal, set aside the lower judgments and declared section 68 of the provincial regulations invalid, with immediate effect.
The reasons tied the constitutional defect to offences punishable by disciplinary segregation or forfeiture of earned remission. The majority expressly left for another day whether section 11 of the Charter applies to Saskatchewan’s minor disciplinary offences. The case did not decide an individual inmate’s guilt, order a particular prisoner released or award compensation.
The Court also permitted the society to raise its section 11 argument for the first time on appeal. Both opinions agreed there was no procedural prejudice and that refusing to decide the issue risked injustice through unnecessary expense and delay.
Punishment within a prison still affects liberty
The challenged system used a balance of probabilities: a disciplinary panel had to find it more likely than not that an inmate committed the offence. For major offences, available sanctions included up to 10 days of disciplinary segregation or forfeiture of up to 15 days of earned remission. The judgment also noted that sanctions arising from separate incidents could run consecutively.
Earned remission allows qualifying prisoners to leave custody earlier through credits for good behaviour and participation in rehabilitation. Losing those credits therefore means more time incarcerated. Disciplinary segregation further restricts the freedom and human contact that a prisoner otherwise retains inside an institution.
Under the practice described in the evidence, Saskatchewan inmates in disciplinary segregation were guaranteed only one hour outside their cells each day. Some retained a cellmate, television or natural light, but those conditions were not guaranteed by the legislation. The majority considered the added restriction a distinct form of imprisonment even though the person was already serving a sentence.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Richard Wagner rejected a rigid distinction between the original prison sentence and later changes to its conditions. The question was the punishment’s effect on liberty, rather than the administrative label attached to it. Both segregation and lost earned remission qualified as penal consequences that brought the offences within section 11.
Departing from an earlier precedent
That conclusion required the Court to depart from part of its 1990 decision in R. v. Shubley. Shubley had treated disciplinary segregation and lost remission as changes in how a sentence was served, rather than imprisonment engaging section 11. Wagner concluded that later Charter jurisprudence had undermined that formal distinction.
The majority did not decide that the disciplinary proceedings were themselves criminal in nature. Its conclusion rested on the potential penal consequences. Nor did it extend section 11 to every serious state-imposed restriction on liberty: the person must be charged with an offence carrying the relevant risk of punishment.
Section 11(d) required proof beyond a reasonable doubt before guilt could be found. Wagner also concluded that section 7 independently required the same standard in these proceedings, because they combined an accusation of moral wrongdoing with potentially severe punishment affecting liberty.
Saskatchewan’s interest in resolving prison discipline quickly was important, the majority accepted. But it did not justify the lower standard. Federal penitentiaries had used proof beyond a reasonable doubt for decades, and Saskatchewan had supplied no evidence that the higher standard prevented timely discipline there. The majority found the provincial measure impaired the protected rights more than necessary.
Three judges would have upheld the provincial rule
Justice Suzanne Côté, joined by Justices Malcolm Rowe and Mahmud Jamal, disagreed. They considered Shubley binding and viewed the proceedings as an administrative system for maintaining prison order. In their analysis, the sanctions regulated conduct within an existing sentence and did not amount to the penal consequences that trigger section 11. Côté would have reached that conclusion even through a fresh application of the constitutional test, independently of Shubley.
The dissent accepted that inmates’ liberty interests were engaged under section 7. It viewed the presumption of innocence as context-sensitive and found that prison discipline involved neither a determination of criminal guilt nor consequences analogous to a criminal sentence. It nevertheless considered the existing procedural protections sufficient, including notice of the charge, an opportunity to respond and present relevant information, and an appeal. Côté warned that the majority’s reasoning could unsettle flexible proof standards beyond prison discipline, and disputed whether the legal foundation of Shubley had actually eroded.
The dissent also questioned reliance on the federal system to resolve whether Saskatchewan could justify its own rule. Had it found a breach, it would have returned that justification question to the application judge. The majority instead resolved it and made the declaration effective immediately, finding no demonstrated compelling public interest requiring a delay.
The John Howard Society was awarded costs throughout the proceedings, but its request for exceptional special costs was refused. The ruling changed the constitutional standard for the serious disciplinary consequences at issue; it did not outlaw those sanctions themselves.
Saskatchewan changed its rules in 2026
The province subsequently enacted The Correctional Services Amendment Act, 2026, which received royal assent on May 14. Its replacement inmate-discipline provisions took effect on August 1, 2026, as recorded in the Saskatchewan Gazette’s commencement table. The accompanying amending regulations took effect the same day. They replaced section 68 with separate standards: proof beyond a reasonable doubt for major disciplinary offences and a balance of probabilities for minor offences.
The legislation assigns major disciplinary proceedings to hearing adjudicators, with the regulations prescribing qualified justices of the peace for that role. The August commencement did not extend to every provision of the amendment Act, including its separate new administrative-segregation regime. These legislative changes establish the governing rules; they do not establish how any particular disciplinary hearing was conducted.
Source: John Howard Society of Saskatchewan v. Saskatchewan (Attorney General), 2025 SCC 6.



