
The Federal Court of Appeal upheld a ruling that Saddle Lake’s exclusion of Bill C-31 members from band council voting was unconstitutional, rejecting an argument that the prohibition was protected by the Charter’s safeguard for Indigenous rights.
In Saddle Lake Cree Nation #462 v. Collins, 2026 FCA 125, released July 3, the court dismissed Saddle Lake’s appeal with agreed, all-inclusive costs of $25,000. It found that the necessary evidence to support either a section 25 shield or a section 1 justification had not been provided.
The ruling did not decide whether section 28’s guarantee of equal rights to men and women would override section 25. The section 25 argument failed at an earlier stage, making that question unnecessary.
A restored member still denied a vote
Gail Collins became a Saddle Lake member in 1985 after her mother was reinstated following Bill C-31 amendments to the Indian Act. Those amendments restored status to women who had lost it by marrying non-status men and extended restoration to their children.
Saddle Lake Cree Nation #462 comprises Saddle Lake Cree Nation #125 and Whitefish Lake First Nation #128. Although recognized as one band under the Indian Act, the communities hold separate elections under the same Tribal Customs Election Law. Collins sought to vote in the Saddle Lake #125 elections.
She challenged the refusal to let Bill C-31 members vote in the 2022 election and sought constitutional declarations. In 2023, the Federal Court found the election officer’s decision unreasonable and the voting prohibition contrary to section 15 of the Charter. It declared the prohibition unconstitutional, initially suspending that declaration for six months to allow amendments.
By the appeal, another election had passed. Collins had again been denied a vote in June 2025. The appeal court found that returning the old administrative decision to the election officer would serve no purpose, but the continuing constitutional dispute remained live.
The source of the prohibition was established
Saddle Lake initially disputed the basis for judicial-review jurisdiction but later conceded that the election officer’s decision could be reviewed. That concession resolved the objection. The court also explained that judicial review under section 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act extends to a broader matter affecting an applicant, not only a particular formal decision.
At the hearing, Saddle Lake questioned whether section 2(a) of its election law was actually the source of the exclusion. That provision used a historical designation associated with women who lost status under the former marrying-out rule.
The court rejected this new position. It had not been properly raised in the notice of appeal or clearly presented in the amended written argument. Raising it earlier would have allowed evidence to address it. Saddle Lake’s own notice of appeal had expressly connected Collins’s exclusion to section 2(a).
The existing record also supported that connection, including evidence linking the exclusion to concerns about funding and land available for restored members. The court found no error in the Federal Court’s interpretation of the provision.
Section 25 required evidence, not assertion
Saddle Lake no longer disputed that the Charter applied, following the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Dickson v. Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation. Nor did it deny the initial section 15 breach. Its remaining position was that section 25 protected the prohibition or section 1 justified it.
Under Dickson, a party invoking section 25 must establish an Aboriginal, treaty or other protected right. For an asserted other right, it must demonstrate both the right’s existence and that it protects or recognizes Indigenous difference.
Saddle Lake conceded that its election rules did not flow from an Aboriginal or treaty right. It relied instead on self-government, including the ability to set voting criteria, and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
The court found no evidence establishing that this voting prohibition qualified as the asserted protected right. Merely invoking the declaration was insufficient. Because that evidentiary requirement was not met, the court did not proceed to the proposed interaction between sections 25 and 28.
It likewise found no basis to disturb the conclusion that insufficient evidence supported a section 1 justification. The dismissal left the lower court’s invalidity ruling in place; it did not grant a new six-month suspension or decide that every Indigenous election rule falls outside section 25 protection.



