Canadian beef buyers can pursue a class claim that meatpackers coordinated their purchases of cattle and drove up the price of beef. In Bui v. Cargill, Incorporated, the Supreme Court of British Columbia declined to certify a second allegation that the packers also coordinated their sales of processed beef. The distinction turns on what the evidence showed about each side of the packing business.

Meatpackers buy fed cattle for slaughter and sell the resulting beef. The plaintiff alleges that packers coordinated when and how much cattle they bought and slaughtered. On that account, paying less for cattle and limiting the supply of beef allowed the packers to widen their margins while consumers paid more. The second allegation concerned a separate agreement among packers to control production or prices in the market where they sell beef.

In an October 2025 ruling, Justice Thomas found enough evidence for purchasers to pursue the first theory together. The judge ordered the production of U.S. investigative demands and adjourned the hearing to see whether those documents supported the second theory as well.

The American evidence mattered because both sides’ economists described links between the U.S. and Canadian markets for cattle and beef. The defendant groups confirmed sales of cattle or beef in Canada. Public disclosures by two packers and records of U.S. civil cases helped identify the buying practices under investigation. That combination gave the judge a basis to infer that similar arrangements could exist in Canada.

The earlier U.S. Justice Department investigation concerned specific conduct involving fed cattle. Evidence that cattle purchases could affect the price of boxed beef supported the buyers’ account of how the first alleged agreement could hurt them. It said little about whether packers had made a second agreement when selling that beef. The U.S. department closed that investigation in September 2025.

New demands issued in January 2026 did ask about conduct in the beef market. The plaintiff argued that the scope of the investigation supplied the minimum evidence needed at certification. Justice Thomas found that the broad requests for information gave no particulars of an arrangement among sellers. The judge accepted that evidence of a secret agreement can be hard to obtain before discovery. Even at this preliminary stage, however, the buyers needed some basis to infer that such an agreement could have existed.

The documents also showed why an investigation into prices could fall short. A federal demand about the closure of a Tyson processing plant asked what reduced cattle processing would mean for beef sales. Separately, New York’s attorney general had sought records of Tyson’s prices and terms for retailers during the pandemic. Neither request pointed to a broader agreement among packers on the terms of their beef sales.

The ruling draws a further distinction about the claim that can proceed. The judge found no legal basis for the allegation that coordination in cattle purchases violated section 45 of the Competition Act. The buyers could, however, pursue their civil conspiracy claim about those purchases. For the alleged agreement on beef sales, the problem was the evidence supporting a common question, even though the allegations as pleaded could support a legal claim.

The purchasers can pursue a civil conspiracy claim over the cattle-market conduct against the subsidiaries and their parent companies. The judge also limited related claims, including unjust enrichment and punitive damages, to that conduct. The ruling leaves the purchasers to prove that a conspiracy occurred and that it caused a loss.

Justice Thomas directed the plaintiff to narrow the proposed common question about civil conspiracy and revise the notices to the class. The defendants may make further submissions on those changes.

Read the B.C. Supreme Court’s reasons, 2026 BCSC 1939.